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This article pertains to a line of research aimed at exploring agency and information flow in sit-
uations in which truth is socially constructed. Such situations are ubiquitous in the real world. A
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prime example is the validity of contracts. Establishing that an agreement constitutes a valid con-
tract appeals to notions such as legal competency and bona fide offers, which are inherently so-
cially constructed. The ultimate way in which the validity of a contract can be ascertained is for it to
be tested in a court of law. In this last instance, the validity of a contract is thus procedural and may
also admit of situations in which it is indeterminate, such as when the court declares itself incompe-
tent. These are features at odds with standard classical logic. Accommodating these features within
classical logic requires additional encoding mechanisms. The alternative is working with logics
that are specifically designed to accommodate these characteristics of socially constructed truth.
Examples of situations where truth is socially constructed are certainly not confined to contract
law but are easy to find in many other contexts. These include establishing public opinion in a
binding way, such as referendums, establishing whether a certain item of clothing is fashionable,
and determining the value of products in a market.
There is a large literature on logics that very adequately capture agency and information flow
(see Reference [39] and references therein) but assume a notion of truth that is classical. There is
therefore a need for a uniform methodology for transferring these logics onto nonclassical bases.
In References [34, 36], a uniform methodology is introduced for defining the nonclassical counter-
parts of dynamic epistemic logics. This methodology, further pursued in References [5, 6, 38], is
grounded on semantics and is based on the dual characterizations of the transformations of models
that interpret epistemic actions.
The present article expands on Reference [16] and applies the methodology of References [34,
36] to obtain nonclassical counterparts of probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic (PDEL) [33, 40]. In-
tuitionistic logic is the propositional base of the version of PDEL introduced in the present article.
The intuitionistic base lends itself to a finer-grained analysis of dynamic updates than the classi-
cal base. For instance, the fact that the box-type and the diamond-type modalities are no longer
interdefinable makes several axioms non-equivalent that are logically equivalent in the classical
setting. Moreover, the intuitionistic relational semantics allows for propositions to be neither true
nor false at some states, a feature that, as discussed above, accommodates more naturally than
classical models the characteristic features of the truth of statements regarding social constructs
such as the validity of contracts or the bankruptcy of a firm (the latter being the focal notion of the
case study discussed in Section 7). Perhaps even more importantly, the intuitionistic environment
helps to highlight the fact that in situations such as those described in the case study, decisions
are taken based on beliefs and expectations rather than on facts-of-the-matter, the truth of which
might be undefined when the decision-making takes place.
Moving to the intuitionistic base also requires the use of intuitionistic probability theory (cf.
References [3, 23]) as the background framework for probabilistic reasoning. From the point of
view of applications, this generalization is needed to account for situations in which the probability
of a certain proposition p is interpreted as an agent’s propensity to bet on p given some evidence
for or against p. If there is little or no evidence for or against p, it should be reasonable to attribute
low probability values to both p and ¬p, which is forbidden by classical probability theory (cf.
Reference [44]).
Finally, these mathematical developments appear in tandem with interesting analyses on the
philosophical side of formal logic (e.g., Reference [4]), exploring epistemic logic in an evidentialist
key, which is congenial to the kind of social situations targeted by our research program.
Our methodology is based on the dual characterization of the product update construction for
standard PDEL-models as a certain construction transforming the complex algebras associated
with a given model into the complex algebra associated with the updated model. This dual charac-
terization naturally generalizes to much wider classes of algebras, which include arbitrary classical
S5 algebras and certain monadic Heyting algebras. As an application of this dual characterization,
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we introduce the axiomatization of the intuitionistic analogue of PDEL semantically arising from
this construction and prove its soundness and completeness with respect to the class of so-called
algebraic probabilistic epistemic models (see Definition 5.3).
Structure of the article. In Section 2, we recall the definition of classical PDEL and its relational
semantics. We give an alternative presentation of the product update construction that consists
of two steps, as done in Reference [34]. The two-step construction highlights the elements that
will be key in the dualization. In Section 3, we expand on the methodology making use of Stone
duality. Section 4 is the main section, in which the construction of the PDEL-updates on epistemic
Heyting algebras is introduced. In Section 5, we define axiomatically the intuitionistic version of
PDEL (IPDEL) and its interpretation on algebraic probabilistic epistemic models and discuss the
proof of its soundness. In Section 6, we introduce the relational semantics of IPDEL. In Section 7,
we discuss the case study of decision-making under uncertainty in a situation to which socially
constructed truth is key. In Section 8, we collect conclusions and further directions. Appendix A
collects some proofs of Section 4. Appendix B contains the proof of soundness of IPDEL with
respect to algebraic probabilistic epistemic models. Appendix C contains the proof of completeness
of IPDEL with respect to algebraic probabilistic epistemic models.
2 PDEL LANGUAGE AND UPDATES
The present section is mostly devoted to preliminaries on classical PDEL, but contains also an orig-
inal contribution in the form of an alternative, two-step account of the product update construction
on PDEL-models. This account is similar to the treatment of epistemic updates in References [34,
36], and, as explained in Section 3, lays the groundwork to the dualization procedure that moti-
vates the construction introduced in Section 4. The specific PDEL framework we report on shares
common features with those of References [2, 8], and [40].
In Section 2.1, we recall basic facts about probability theory and collect preliminaries on clas-
sical PDEL and its associated models and event structures. In Section 2.2, we give an alternative
presentation of the construction of the epistemic update of a PES-model induced by a probabilistic
event structure. This alternative presentation is closer to the update construction we introduce in
the subsequent sections, which is the core technical contribution of this article. In Sections 2.3 and
2.4 s respectively, we collect preliminaries on the interpretation pf PDEL-formulas on PES-models
and on the axiomatization of classical PDEL.
2.1 Language and Models of PDEL
Let us start by recalling the standard definitions of probability distribution and probability mea-
sure. For any finite set X , a probability distribution P over X is a map
P : X → [0, 1]
such that ∑
x ∈X
P (x ) = 1.
A probability measure on PX is a map
μ : PX → [0, 1]
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satisfying the following properties:
(1) μ (∅) = 0,
(2) μ (X ) = 1,
(3) for any A,B ⊆ X , we have μ (A ∪ B) = μ (A) + μ (B) − μ (A ∩ B).
The probability measure μ : PX → [0, 1] associated with a probability distribution P over X is
defined as follows: for any S ⊆ X ,




In the remainder of the article, we fix a countable set AtProp of proposition letters p,q, and a
non-empty finite set Ag of agents i . We let α1, . . . ,αn , β denote rational numbers.
Definition 2.1 (PDEL Syntax). The set L of PDEL-formulas φ and the class of probabilistic event
structures E over L (see Definition 2.4) are built by simultaneous recursion as follows:
φ ::= p | ⊥ | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | φ → φ | ♦iφ | iφ | 〈E, e〉φ | [E, e]φ | 
n∑
k=1
αk μi (φ) ≥ β,
where p ∈ AtProp, i ∈ Ag, α1, . . . ,αn , β are rational numbers,1 and the event structures E are as
in Definition 2.4.
The connectives , ¬, and↔ are defined by the usual abbreviations.
In the literature in probabilistic logic, it is common to use, e.g., αPi (φ) ≥ β as the syntax of
formulas describing the probabilities of events. However, in the models defined below, the maps
Pi are probability distributions, which take states of the model rather than extensions of formulas
in input. To avoid any ambiguities, in the definition above, we use the syntactic μi s to stress the fact
that their intended interpretation is as probability measures rather than probability distributions.
Definition 2.2 (PES-Model). A probabilistic epistemic state model (PES-model) is a structure
M =
〈
S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
〉
such that
(1) S is a finite set,
(2) each binary relation ∼i is an equivalence relation on S ,
(3) each map Pi : S → ]0, 1] restricts to a strictly positive probability distribution over each
∼i -equivalence class, (i.e.,
∑{Pi (s ′) : s ′ ∼i s} = 1), and
(4) the map [[·]] : AtProp→ PS is a valuation.
The interpretation of PDEL-formulas in PES-models is reported in Section 2.3 and is based on
the epistemic update construction discussed in Section 2.2. As usual, the map [[·]] will be identified
with its unique extension to L, so we will be able to write [[φ]] for every φ ∈ L.
Remark 1. In the definition above, the assumption that the probability of each state is strictly
positive is needed for the update construction in Definition 2.7 to be well defined, since it involves
taking a quotient. This is also the convention followed in Reference [42], where subjective prob-
abilities are identified with “lotteries” assigned to each agent, and are hence taken to be strictly
positive. For the same reason, an analogous assumption is made of the event structures of Defini-
tion 2.4 below, an assumption that is also made of the event structures in References [1, 42].
A key difference between PDEL and dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) concerns the nature of the
actions or events: while in DEL the actions are epistemic, and as such their main feature is that
1Using rational numbers rather than, e.g., real numbers guarantees that the language remains denumerable.
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they do not change the truth values of atomic propositions, PDEL deals with events that might
change the truth values of atomic propositions. The following auxiliary definition feeds into the
main Definition 2.4 and provides a formal account of this feature of events:
Definition 2.3 (Substitution Function). A substitution function
σ : AtProp→ L
is a function that maps all but a finite2 number of proposition letters to themselves.
We let the set
supp (σ ) := {p ∈ AtProp | σ (p)  p}
be called the support of σ .
Let SubL denote the set of all substitution functions and ϵ the identity substitution.
Definition 2.4 (Probabilistic Event Structure Over a Language). A probabilistic event structure over
L is a tuple
E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub),
such that
(1) E is a non-empty finite set,
(2) each ∼i is an equivalence relation on E,
(3) each Pi : E → ]0, 1] restricts to a strictly positive probability distribution over each ∼i -
equivalence class, i.e., ∑ {
Pi (e
′) | e ′ ∼i e
}
= 1,
(4) Φ is a finite set of pairwise inconsistent L-formulas, and
(5) pre assigns a probability distribution pre(•|ϕ) over E for every ϕ ∈ Φ.
(6) sub : E → SubL assigns a substitution function to each event in E.
Informally, elements of E encode possible events, the relations ∼i encode as usual the epistemic
uncertainty of the agent i , who assigns probability Pi (e ) to e being the actually occurring event,
formulas in Φ are intended as the preconditions of the event, and pre(e |ϕ) expresses the prior
probability that the event e ∈ E might occur in a(ny) state satisfying precondition ϕ. In addition,
the substitution map sub(e ) assigned to each event e ∈ E describes how the event e changes the
atomic facts of the world as represented by the proposition letters. In what follows, we will refer
to the structures E defined above as event structures over L.
Notation 1. For any probabilistic epistemic state model M = 〈S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]〉, any
probabilistic event structure E, any s ∈ S and e ∈ E, we let pre(e | s ) denote the value pre(e | ϕ),
for the unique ϕ ∈ Φ such that M, s  ϕ (recall that the formulas in Φ are pairwise inconsistent). If
no such ϕ exists, then we let pre(e | s ) = 0.
2.2 Epistemic Updates
In this subsection, we introduce an alternative and equivalent presentation of the update con-
struction on PES-models. This presentation is a variant of those introduced in References [34, 36]
for models of public announcement logic and dynamic epistemic logic and consists of a two-step
process—namely, a co-product-type construction followed by a subobject-type construction. We
can then dualize the two steps separately, and thus obtain the construction of (probabilistic) epis-
temic updates on algebras as the composition of the two dualized constructions. The two steps
2This assumption guarantees that events affect only a finite number of facts.
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are given in Definition 2.5 and Definition 2.7, and Lemma 2.8 proves that the updated model of a
PES-model is also a PES-model.
Definition 2.5 (Intermediate Structure). For any PES-model M = 〈S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]〉 and
any probabilistic event structure E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub) over L, let the intermediate


























|E | S  S × E is the |E |-fold coproduct of S ,




|E | S is defined as follows:
(s, e ) ∼
∐
i (s
′, e ′) iff s ∼i s ′ and e ∼i e ′,




|E | S → [0, 1] is defined by
(s, e ) → Pi (s ) · Pi (e ) · pre(e | s ),
(4) and the valuation [[·]]∐ : AtProp→ PS is defined by
[[p]]∐ := {(s, e ) | s ∈ [[p]]M} = [[p]]M × E
for every p ∈ AtProp.
Notice that, because pre(e | s ) can be zero, by construction P
∐
i is not strictly positive. Moreover,
in general, P
∐
i does not induce probability distributions over the ∼
∐
i -equivalence classes. Hence,∐
EM is not a PES-model. However, the second step of the construction will yield a PES-model.
Finally, to define the updated model, observe that the map pre : E × Φ→ [0, 1] in E induces the
map pre : E → L defined below.
Definition 2.6. For any probabilistic event structure E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub) over
L, let the map pre be defined as follows:
pre : E → L
e →
∨
{ϕ ∈ Φ | pre(e | ϕ)  0}.
Definition 2.7 (Updated Model). For any PES-model M = 〈S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]〉 and any
probabilistic event structure E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub) over L, let the epistemic update
















(1) S E := {(s, e ) ∈ ∐ |E | S | M, s  pre (e )};
(2) ∼Ei = ∼
∐
i ∩ (S E × S E ) for any i ∈ Ag;
(3) each map P Ei : S
E → [0, 1] is defined by the assignment
(s, e ) →
P
∐




′, e ′) | (s, e ) ∼i (s ′, e ′)
} ;
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(4) the map [[·]]ME : AtProp→ P (S E ) is defined as follows:
[[p]]ME := [[sub (p)]]
∐ ∩ S E ,
where the map sub (p) : E → L is given by:
sub (p) (e ) :=
{
sub(e ) (p) if p ∈ supp (sub(e ))
p otherwise.
Item (4) in the definition above captures in a formal way the change in the states of affairs
brought about by the event taking place (see also discussion before Definition 2.3).
Lemma 2.8. For any PES-model M and any probabilistic event structure E over L, the epistemic
update ME of the model M by the probabilistic event structure E is a PES-model.
Proof. To prove that ME is a PES-model (Definition 2.2), we need to show that it satisfies the
following properties:
(1) the set S E is finite,
(2) each relation ∼Ei is an equivalence relation on S ,
(3) each map P Ei : S
E → ]0, 1] assigns a strictly positive probability distribution over each
∼Ei -equivalence class,
(4) the map [[·]] : AtProp→ PS E is well defined.
Item (1) immediately follows by construction, since the product of finite sets is finite. Likewise,
item (2) follows from the intersection of equivalence relations being an equivalence relation. As to
item (3), by construction, P Ei is a probability distribution over∼Ei -equivalence classes. To show that
P Ei is strictly positive, it is enough to show that P
∐
i (s, e ) is strictly positive for every (s, e ) ∈ S E .
By Definition 2.5, P
∐
i (s, e ) := Pi (s ) · Pi (e ) · pre(e | s ). Hence, the statement follows from the fact
that both Pi (s ) and Pi (e ) are strictly positive (cf. items (3) of Definitions 2.2 and 2.4), and the fact
that if (s, e ) ∈ S E , then by definition M, s  pre (e ) = ∨{ϕ ∈ Φ | pre(e | ϕ)  0}, i.e., M, s  ϕ for
some (unique) ϕ ∈ Φ such that pre(e | ϕ)  0 and hence, by Notation 1, pre(e | s ) = pre(e | ϕ) > 0.
By construction, the map in item (4) is well defined, which completes the proof. 
2.3 Interpretation of PDEL-formulas on PES-models
Definition 2.9 (Probability Measure). Every PES-model
M =
〈
S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
〉
,
induces the probability measure μMi : S × L → [0, 1] defined as follows: for any ϕ ∈ L,
μMi (s,ϕ) :=
∑
s ∼i s ′
s ′ ∈ [[ϕ]]
Pi (s
′).
Notice that μi defines a probability measure on each ∼i -equivalence class.
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Definition 2.10 (Semantics of PDEL). For any PES-model M =
〈
S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
〉
, the in-
terpretation of L-formulas at states in M is defined by the following recursion:
M, s  ⊥ iff never
M, s  p iff s ∈ [[p]]
M, s  ϕ ∧ψ iff M, s  ϕ and M, s  ψ
M, s  ϕ ∨ψ iff M, s  ϕ or M, s  ψ
M, s  ϕ → ψ iff M, s  ϕ implies M, s  ψ
M, s  ♦iϕ iff there exists s ′ ∼i s such that M, s ′  ϕ
M, s  iϕ iff M, s ′  ϕ for all s ′ ∼i s
M, s  〈E, e〉ϕ iff M, s  pre (e ) and ME , (s, e )  ϕ
M, s  [E, e]ϕ iff M, s  pre (e ) implies ME , (s, e )  ϕ
M, s  
n∑
k=1





i (s,φ) ≥ β,
where in the last clause αk and β are rational numbers (cf. Footnote 1) and the probability measures
μMi are defined as in Definition 2.9.
2.4 Axiomatization
PDEL is a logical framework bringing together epistemics, dynamics, and probabilities. Hence, its
axiomatization describes the behavior of each of these components as well as their interactions.
The full axiomatization of PDEL is given in Table 1 and includes the axioms of classical multi-
modal logic S5, understood as the basic epistemic logic, axioms capturing the theory of linear
inequalities with rational coefficients (cf. Reference [21, Theorem 4.3], so, for instance, axioms n2
and n3 capture the commutativity and monotonicity of +, and distributivity of ·), axioms captur-
ing basic classical probability theory (cf. References [1, 20, 21, 40, 42]), and axioms encoding the
interaction between the dynamic modalities and the other logical connectives [1, 40], as well as
the following inference rules: modus ponens, uniform substitution (see Reference [43]), necessita-
tion for the static and dynamic modalities, and a substitution rule for the probabilistic operators
μi (cf. References [1, 20, 40, 42]).
Lemma 2.11 (Soundness and Completeness). PDEL is sound and complete w.r.t. the axiomati-
zation given in Table 1.
Proof. The statement follows from the general proof in Appendix C and Stone-type duality. 
3 METHODOLOGY
Let us expand on the methodology of the article. In the previous section, we gave a two-step
account of the product update construction that, for any PES-model M and any event model E
overL, yields the updated model ME as a certain submodel of a certain intermediate model ∐EM.
This account is analogous to those given in References [34, 36] of the product updates of models
of PAL and of Baltag-Moss-Solecki’s dynamic epistemic logic EAK. In each instance, the original
product update construction can be illustrated by the following diagram (which uses the notation
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Table 1. Axioms of PDEL
Axioms of classical modal logic S5
Tautologies of classical propositional logic
k. i (φ → ψ ) → (iφ → iψ )
dual. iφ ↔ ¬♦i¬φ
t. iφ → φ
iv. iφ → iiφ
v. ¬iφ → i¬iφ
Axioms capturing the theory of linear inequalities with rational coefficients
n0. t ≥ t









αρ (k ) · μi (φρ (k ) ) ≥ β
)



















) · μi (φk ) ≥ (β + β ′)
)
n4. ((t ≥ β ) ∧ (d ≥ 0)) → (d · t ≥ d · β )
n5. (t ≥ β ) ∨ (β ≥ t )
n6. (t ≥ β ) → (t > γ ) for all γ < β
Axioms capturing basic classical probability theory
p1. μi (⊥) = 0 p2. μi () = 1
p3. μi (φ ∧ψ ) + μi (φ ∧ ¬ψ ) = μi (φ)









αk · μi (φk ) ≥ β
)
Reduction Axioms
i1. [E, e]p ↔ (pre (e ) → sub(e ) (p))
i2. [E, e]¬φ ↔ (pre (e ) → ¬[E, e]φ)
i4. [E, e](φ ∧ψ ) ↔ ([E, e]φ ∧ [E, e]ψ )
i5. [E, e]iA↔ (pre (e ) →




αk · μi (ψk ) ≥ β
)













e∼i f β · pre( f | ϕ) · μi (ϕ)
Inference Rules
MP if  A→ B and  A, then  B
Neci if  A, then  iA
Necα if  A, then  [E, e]A
Subμ if  A→ B, then  μi (A) ≤ μi (B)
SubEq if  A↔ B, then  ϕ ↔ ϕ[A/B]
As is well known (see, e.g., Reference [19]) in duality theory, coproducts can be dually charac-
terized as products, and subobjects as quotients. In light of this fact, the construction of product
update, regarded as a “subobject after coproduct” concatenation, can be dually characterized on
the algebras dual to the relational structures of PES-models by means of a “quotient after product”




A  AE ,
resulting in the following two-step process: First, the coproduct
∐
E M is dually characterized as a
certain product
∏
E A, indexed as well by the states of E, and such thatA is the algebraic dual ofM;
second, an appropriate quotient of
∏
E A is then taken, which dually characterizes the submodel
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step. On which algebras are we going to apply the “quotient after product” construction? The prime
candidates are the algebras associated with the PES-models via standard Stone-type duality:
Definition 3.1 (Complex Algebra). For any PES-modelM = 〈S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]〉, its complex
algebra is the tuple
M+ := (PS, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag, (P+i )i ∈Ag),
where for each i ∈ Ag and X ∈ PS ,
♦iX = {s ∈ S | ∃x (s ∼i x and x ∈ X )} ,
iX = {s ∈ S | ∀x (s ∼i x ⇒ x ∈ X )} ,
dom(P+i ) =
{







Notice that the domain of P+i consists of all the subsets of the equivalence classes of ∼i .
In this setting, the “quotient after product” construction behaves exactly in the desired way, in
the sense that one can check a posteriori that the following holds:
Proposition 3.2. For every PES-model M and any event structure E over L, the algebraic struc-
tures (M+)E and (ME )+ can be identified.
Proof. This results follows from: (1) Fact 12 in Reference [34] that states that for any (non prob-
abilistic) Kripke model N , the structures (N+)E and (NE )+ can be identified, and (2) Lemma 4.32
on page 23 that states that the probability measures on the complex algebras (M+)E and (ME )+
are the same. 
Moreover, the “quotient after product” construction holds in much greater generality than the
class of complex algebras of PES-models, which is exactly its added value over the update on
relational structures. In the following section, we are going to define it in detail in the setting of
epistemic Heyting algebras.
4 PROBABILISTIC DYNAMIC EPISTEMIC UPDATES ON FINITE HEYTING ALGEBRAS
The present section aims at introducing the algebraic counterpart of the event update construction
of Section 2. For the sake of enforcing a neat separation between syntax and semantics, through-
out the present section, we disregard the logical language L, and work on algebraic probabilis-
tic epistemic structures (APE-structures, see Definition 4.7) rather than on APE-models (i.e., APE-
structures endowed with valuations). Consequently, to be able to define the update construction,
we will base our treatment on a modified definition of event structure over an algebra, rather than
over L. In Section 4.1, we introduce epistemic Heyting algebras. In Section 4.2, we recall the defi-
nition of intuitionistic probability from Reference [44] and endow epistemic Heyting algebras with
measures to define algebraic probabilistic epistemic structures. In Section 4.3, we define probabilis-
tic event structures over epistemic algebras as the intuitionistic algebraic counterparts of classical
probabilistic event structures. In Section 4.4, we introduce the construction of intermediate pre-
probabilistic event structure as the first step of the algebraic event update construction. Finally, in
Section 4.5, we introduce the pseudo-quotient update construction and define the event update on
algebraic probabilistic epistemic structures.
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4.1 Epistemic Heyting Algebras
We start this subsection by recalling the definition of monadic Heyting algebras, i.e., the algebraic
semantics of the logic MIPC, the intuitionistic analogue of the classical modal logic S5 (cf. Ref-
erences [11, 12, 34]). Then, we introduce the notion of i-minimal element of a monadic Heyting
algebra. Finally, we define epistemic Heyting algebras as a subclass of monadic Heyting algebras
with enough i-minimal elements to describe certain subalgebras of interest for the developments
of the next sections.
Definition 4.1 (Monadic Heyting Algebra (cf. Reference [11])). A monadic Heyting algebra is a tuple
A := (L, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag)
such that L is a Heyting algebra, and each ♦i and i is a monotone unary operation on L such
that for all a,b ∈ L,
♦ia ≤ i♦ia (M5)
a ≤ ♦ia (M1) ♦iia ≤ ia (M6)
ia ≤ a (M2) i (a → b) ≤ ♦ia → ♦ib (M7)
♦i (a ∨ b) ≤ ♦ia ∨ ♦ib (M3) ♦i⊥ ≤ ⊥ (M8)
i (a → b) ≤ ia → ib (M4)  ≤ i (M9)
Remark 2. The algebraic and duality theoretic treatment of monadic Heyting algebras has been
developed in References [11] and [12]. In particular, as mentioned in Reference [11, Lemma 2],
in the presence of (M9), axiom (M4) is equivalent to ia ∧ ib ≤ i (a ∧ b), so all modalities are
normal, and ♦i♦ia ≤ ♦ia and ia ≤ iia are derivable from the axioms. These conditions corre-
spond also in the best-known intuitionistic settings to the transitivity of the associated accessibility
relations (cf. Reference [17]). This implies in particular that ♦i is a closure operator for each i ∈ Ag.
The next definition intends to capture algebraically the notion of equivalence cell in the epis-
temic space of agents. Notice that for any equivalence relation R on a set X and any x ∈ X , the
equivalence cell R[x] = R−1[x] = 〈R〉{x } is a minimal nonempty fixed point of 〈R〉.3 This justifies
the following definition:
Definition 4.2 (i-Minimal Elements). Let A be a monadic Heyting algebra. An element a ∈ A is
i-minimal if
(1) a  ⊥,
(2) ♦ia = a, and
(3) if b ∈ A, b < a and ♦ib = b, then b = ⊥.
Let Mini (A) denote the set of the i-minimal elements of A.
Remark 3. Notice that, for anyb ∈ A \ {⊥}, there exists at most onea ∈ Mini (A) such thatb ≤ a.
Indeed, every such a must coincide with ♦ib.
3Recall that, for any binary relation R ⊆ X × X , we define the maps R , R−1 and 〈R〉 as follows:
R : X → PX R−1 : X → PX
x → {x ′ ∈ X | (x, x ′) ∈ R } x → {x ′ ∈ X | (x ′, x ) ∈ R }
〈R〉 : PX → PX
S → {x ′ ∈ X | ∃x ∈ S, (x ′, x ) ∈ R }.
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Definition 4.3 (Epistemic Heyting Algebra). An epistemic Heyting algebra is a finite monadic
Heyting algebra
A := (L, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag)
such that for every i ∈ Ag and every a ∈ A the following holds:
♦ia ∨ ¬♦ia = . (E)
Remark 4. As we will see in Lemma 4.4, condition (E) above implies that, for every agent i , the
range of ♦i can be endowed with a Boolean algebra structure as a subalgebra of A. Condition (E)
captures algebraically the requirement that i-minimal elements, representing cells in the partition
cover the whole space, in the sense that every element of A is below the disjunction of i-minimal
elements. More discussion about this condition can be found in the conclusions.
In the remainder of the present section, A will denote an epistemic Heyting algebra.
Lemma 4.4. If A is an Epistemic Heyting algebra, then, for every agent i ,
♦iA := {♦ia ∈ A | a ∈ A}
is a Boolean sub-algebra of A. Furthermore, if
iA := {ia ∈ A | a ∈ A},
then ♦iA = iA.
Proof. That ♦iA is a subalgebra of A follows from the fact that the equalities
♦i (♦ia ∧ ♦ib) = ♦ia ∧ ♦ib and ♦i (♦ia → ♦ib) = ♦ia → ♦ib
hold in every monadic Heyting algebra (see for example Reference [11, Definition 1, Lemma 2]4).
Using the second identity and ♦i⊥ = ⊥, one can readily show that ¬♦ia = ♦(¬♦ia) ∈ ♦iA for
every a ∈ A. Then ♦ia ∧ ¬♦ia ≤ ⊥ follows by Heyting residuation, and by condition (E), ♦ia ∨
¬♦ia = , which completes the proof that ♦iA is a Boolean algebra.
Finally, let us show that ♦iA = iA. Axiom (M1) implies that ia ≤ ♦iia for every a ∈ A.
Combining this with axiom (M6), we obtain that ia = ♦iia ∈ ♦iA for every a ∈ A, which shows
that iA ⊆ ♦iA. The converse inclusion is shown similarly using axioms (M2) and (M5). 
Remark 5. Given the fact that Epistemic Heyting algebras are finite and since ♦iA is a Boolean




Notation 2. For any poset (partially ordered set) P = (P , ≤), we let
↓P : PP → PP
X → X↓P := {x ′ ∈ P | x ′ ≤ x for some x ∈ X }.
For the sake of readability, we drop the subscript and let X↓ denote the downset generated by X . In
addition, if X = {x }, we let x ↓ denote the downset generated by {x }.
4.2 Algebraic Probabilistic Epistemic Structures
In this Section, we introduce i-premeasures and i-measures and define algebraic pre-probabilistic
and probabilistic epistemic structures that will serve as the underlying structures of intuitionistic
probabilistic epistemic logic.
4As to the first equality, by Reference [11, Definition 1],♦i (♦i a ∧ b ) = ♦i a ∧ ♦i b holds, and instantiating it with b := ♦i b ,
one has ♦i (♦i a ∧ ♦i b ) = ♦i a ∧ ♦i♦i b ; then the required identity follows by observing that ♦i♦i b = ♦i b .
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The following definition is an adaptation of a proposal of Weatherson’s (see Reference [44,
page 2]) in which the notion of probability is generalized and made parametric in a given conse-
quence relation. Even though there is no consensus on what an intuitionistic probability function
should be , Weatherson’s proposal captures necessary conditions for such a function and estab-
lishes a systematic link between logic and probability. We refer to his paper for an explanation and
motivation of his proposal. The definition below has also been adopted by References [3, 23].
Definition 4.5 (Intuitionistic Probability Measures). Let H be a Heyting algebra. A function Pr :
H→ [0, 1] is an intuitionistic probability measure if the following conditions are satisfied: for all
a,b ∈ H,
(1) Pr(⊥) = 0, (3) if a ≤H b, then Pr(a) ≤ Pr(b),
(2) Pr() = 1, (4) Pr(a) + Pr(b) = Pr(a ∨ b) + Pr(a ∧ b).
Notice that, for intuitionistic probability measures, it does no longer hold that Pr(p ∨ ¬p) = 1,
which, as observed in the introduction, makes it possible to assign low subjective probability to
an event and to its negation, when, e.g., one does not have evidence in favor of either.
In classical PDEL, the probability functions range over equivalence classes instead of the whole
model. We capture this fact on the side of the algebras by defining probability functions that are
probability measures on the quotient algebras generated by i-minimal elements.
Definition 4.6 (i-Premeasure & i-Measure). A partial function μ : A→ R+ is an i-premeasure on
A if it satisfies the following properties:
(1) dom(μ ) = Mini (A)↓;
(2) μ is order-preserving;
(3) for every a ∈ Mini (A) and all b, c ∈ a↓, we have μ (b ∨ c ) = μ (b) + μ (c ) − μ (b ∧ c );
(4) μ (⊥) = 0 if ⊥ ∈ dom(μ ).
An i-premeasure on A is an i-measure, if it satisfies the following properties:
(5) μ (a) = 1 for every a ∈ Mini (A).
(6) for every a ∈ Mini (A) and all b, c ∈ a↓ such that b < c , it holds that μ (b) < μ (c );
Condition (1) ensures that the probability measures are defined on the quotient algebras gen-
erated by i-minimal elements. Conditions (2) to (5) are imported from Weatherson’s definition of
intuitionistic probabilistic functions. Condition (6) is classically but not intuitionistically equiv-
alent to the classical condition that probability distributions over the states of each equivalence
class are strictly positive (see Definition 2.2 and Remark 1). In classical logic, this is captured by
the condition that all formulas that are not logically equivalent to ⊥ have non-zero probability,
because all singleton subsets are elements of the complex algebra of a Kripke frame, and hence
they are potential extensions of formulas. However, in the intuitionistic setting this is not enough:
since valuations are persistent, singletons are not in general elements of the complex algebra of
an intuitionistic Kripke frames, so conditions on intuitionistic formulas capture properties of prin-
cipal up-sets (or down-sets) of states in intuitionistic Kripke frames, but not in general of states.
This is part of the reason why we need to resort to the intuitionistically stronger requirement (6).
However, and more importantly, in the intuitionistic setting it would not be reasonable to talk
about the subjective probability distribution of a single state without relating it to all its succes-
sor states, and this is what condition (6) also captures algebraically: it guarantees both that the
subjective probability of any join-irreducible (hence, non ⊥) element is strictly positive, and also
that the probability distribution of successor states is added to the overall probability measure of
extensions of formulas in intuitionistic Kripke frames. Finally, notice that when Mini (A)↓ = ∅,
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there exists a unique i-(pre)measure—namely, the empty function. Throughout this section, all the
results regarding i-minimal elements and i-(pre)measure hold vacuously when Mini (A)↓ = ∅.
Definition 4.7 (ApPE-Structure & APE-Structure). An algebraic pre-probabilistic epistemic struc-
ture (ApPE-structure) is a tuple
F := (A, (μi )i ∈Ag)
such that
(1) A is an epistemic Heyting algebra (see Definition 4.3), and
(2) each μi is an i-premeasure on A.
An ApPE-structure F is an algebraic probabilistic epistemic structure (APE-structure) if each μi is
an i-measure on A.
We refer to A as the support of F and we denote it support(F ).
4.2.1 The Algebraic Epistemic Structure Associated with a Classical Model.
Lemma 4.8. For any PES-model M, the i-minimal elements of its complex algebra M+ are exactly
the equivalence classes of ∼i .
Proof. See Appendix A, page 44. 
Proposition 4.9. For any PES-model M, its complex algebra M+ (see Definition 3.1) is an APE-
structure (see Definition 4.7).
Proof. See Appendix A, page 44. 
4.3 Probabilistic Event Structures over Epistemic Heyting Algebras
In this section, we introduce intuitionistic event structures, which are needed to correctly gener-
alize probabilistic epistemic updates to an intuitionistic metatheory.
We will find it useful to introduce the following auxiliary definitions. Recall that a multiset is a
generalization of the concept of a set that allows multiple instances of the same element. Hence,
{a,a,b} and {a,b} are the same set, but different multisets. However, order does not matter, so
{a,a,b} and {a,b,a} are the same multiset. Let Φ be a multiset on the set X and a,b ∈ Φ. We say
that a and b arise from the same element if a and b are copies of the same element from X . We
denote it a =X b.
Definition 4.10 (Ordered Multiset on a Lattice). Let L = (L, ≤) be a finite lattice. An ordered mul-
tiset Φ = (Φ,≺) on L is a multiset Φ of elements of L equipped with a strict order ≺ such that, for
all pairwise distinct elements x ,y, z ∈ Φ,
(1) if x ≺ y, then x ≤L y;
(2) if x  ⊥ and x ≤L y, then x ≺ y or y ≺ x ;
(3) if x ≺ y and x ≺ z, then y ≺ z or z ≺ y.
In the present article, we use the membership symbol ∈ in the context of multisets on L always
referring to the copies of a given element of L. For instance, the variable y in the symbol y ∈ Φ
refers to one specific copy of some element of L.
Remark 6. In Section 5, we will be working with event structures over logical languages rather
than with event structures over algebras (see Definition 4.11). Event structures over languages (see
Definition 5.2) are tuples where Φ is a set of formulas, each pair of which is made either of incom-
patible formulas or of formulas one of which implies the other (see also Remark 8). However, some
of these formulas might be identified with each other under some valuations. To define updates
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on algebras independently from logic, in Definition 4.11 the ordered multisets above will play the
same role played by the sets Φ in event structures over languages. Specifically, the multiset struc-
ture serves to keep track of the fact that some elements of the lattice might be the interpretation
of more than one formula in the set Φ, and the order on the multiset Φ helps to keep track of the
logical structure of the set Φ. Finally, condition (3) makes sure that the order structure of Φ is an
upward forest, and conditions (1) and (2) together guarantee that, with the exception of formulas
that are mapped to ⊥, the logical structure of the set Φ is preserved and reflected by the order ≺.
Now let us introduce probabilistic event structures in the intuitionistic setting:
Definition 4.11 (Probabilistic Event Structure Over an Epistemic Heyting Algebra). For any epis-
temic Heyting algebra A (see Definition 4.3), a probabilistic event structure over A is a tuple
E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre)
such that
(1) E is a non-empty finite set;
(2) each ∼i is an equivalence relation on E;
(3) each Pi : E → ]0, 1] assigns a probability distribution over each ∼i -equivalence class, i.e.,∑ {
Pi (e
′) | e ′ ∼i e
}
= 1;
(4) Φ = (Φ,≺) is a finite ordered multiset onA such that, for alla,b ∈ Φ that arise from distinct
elements in A, either
a ∧A b = ⊥ or a <A b or b <A a;
(5) the map pre : E × Φ→ [0, 1] assigns a probability distribution pre(•|a) over E for every
a ∈ Φ;
(6) for all a ∈ Φ and e ∈ E, if pre(e |a) = 0, then pre(e |b) = 0 for all b ∈ Φ such that a ≺ b.
The definition above is a proper generalization of the analogous definition given in the classical
setting (Definition 2.4). The main generalization concerns the fact that the elements in Φ (which
are the potential interpretants of formulas) are no longer required to be mutually inconsistent
but may also be “logically dependent.” In this latter case, the precondition function is required to
satisfy an additional compatibility condition that is similar to the one adopted in Reference [3].
For the sake of readability, in what follows, we will simply refer to probabilistic event structures
over epistemic Heyting algebras as event structures.
Remark 7 (The substitution map). Clearly, a purely algebraic counterpart of the substitution map
that was part of the definition of probabilistic event structures over a language (see Definition 2.4)
cannot be given.
Remark 8 (The order ≤A on the set Φ). The classical and the intuitionistic setting are distin-
guished by the fact that states are pairwise incomparable in the classical setting and (non-trivially)
ordered in the intuitionistic setting. Thus, in probabilistic event structures over a language (see
Definition 2.4), it is enough to require the set Φ to contain mutually inconsistent formulas to tell
apart states of the Kripke model. However, due to the order between states of intuitionistic Kripke
frames, mutually incompatible formulas are not enough to separate distinct but comparable states.
To overcome this hurdle, we require Φ to satisfy the following condition: for all ak ,aj ∈ Φ,
aj ∧ ak = ⊥ or aj < ak or ak < aj .
This condition makes it possible to compute the probabilities of a given non-maximal state, even
if there is no proposition uniquely identifying this state (cf. Definition 4.15).
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4.4 The Intermediate (Pre-)probabilistic Epistemic Structure
In the present subsection, we define the intermediate ApPE-structure
∏
E F associated with any







A, (μ ′i )i ∈Ag . (4.1)
Structure of the Subsection. First, we define the intermediate algebra
∏
|E | A that will become the
support of the intermediate ApPE-structure
∏
E F (see Definition 4.12 and Proposition 4.13) and
we identify its i-minimal elements (see Proposition 4.14). Then, we introduce the i-premeasures
on the intermediate algebra (see Definition 4.17 and Proposition 4.18). Finally, we show that the
definition ApPE-structure is coherent with the relational semantics in the classical case (see Propo-
sition 4.21).
4.4.1 The Intermediate Algebra and Its i-minimal Elements.
Definition 4.12 (Intermediate Algebra). For every epistemic Heyting algebra A = (L, (♦i )i ∈Ag,












|E | L is the |E |-fold power of L, the elements of which can be seen either as |E |-tuples
of elements in A or as maps f : E → A;
(2) for any f : E → A, let us define ♦′i ( f ) as follows:
♦′i ( f ) : E → A
e →
∨
{♦i f (e ′) | e ′ ∼i e};
(3) for any f : E → A, let us define ′i ( f ) as follows:
′i ( f ) : E → A
e →
∧
{i f (e ′) | e ′ ∼i e}.
Below, the algebra
∏
EA will be sometimes abbreviated as A
′.
We refer to Reference [34, Section 3.1] for an extensive justification of the definition of the
operations ♦′i and ′i .
Proposition 4.13. For every epistemic Heyting algebra A and every event structure E over A, the
algebra A′ is an epistemic Heyting algebra.
Proof. To prove that A′ is an epistemic Heyting algebra (Definition 4.3), we need to show that
A′ is a monadic Heyting algebra such that for every i ∈ Ag and every f ∈ A′, we have: ♦i f ∨
¬♦i f = .
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The proof that A′ is a monadic Heyting algebra can be found in Reference [34, Proposition 3.1].
Let i ∈ Ag, f ∈ A′, and e ∈ E. We have:
(♦′i f ∨ ¬♦′i f ) (e ) = (♦′i f ) (e ) ∨ ¬(♦′i f ) (e )
=
∨
{♦i ( f (e ′)) | e ′ ∼ e} ∨ ¬
∨
{♦i ( f (e ′)) | e ′ ∼ e} (by definition of ♦′i )
= ♦i
∨
{ f (e ′) | e ′ ∼ e} ∨ ¬♦i
∨
{ f (e ′) | e ′ ∼ e} (by the normality of ♦i )
= . (since ♦ia ∨ ¬♦ia = )
Hence, (♦′i f ∨ ¬♦′i f ) (e ) =  for all e ∈ E, which by definition yields that ♦′i f ∨ ¬♦′i f = . 
Proposition 4.14. For every epistemic Heyting algebra A and every agent i ∈ Ag,
Mini (A
′) = { fe,a | e ∈ E and a ∈ Mini (A)},
where for any e ∈ E and a ∈ Mini (A), the map fe,a is defined as follows:
fe,a : E → A
e ′ →
{
a if e ′ ∼i e
⊥ otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A, page 44. 
4.4.2 The i-premeasures on the Intermediate Algebra. Before providing i-premeasures for the
product epistemic algebra (Definition 4.17 and Proposition 4.18), we present an auxiliary definition:
Definition 4.15. Let F = (A, (μi )i ∈Ag) be an APE-structure and let E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,
Φ, pre) be an event structure over A. For all a ∈ Φ and i ∈ Ag, we define the partial function
μai : A→ R+ by
μai (x ) := μi (x ∧ a) −
∑
b ∈mb(a)
μi (x ∧ b), (4.2)
where mb(a) denotes the multiset of the ≺-maximal elements of Φ ≺-below a.
We make the following observations regarding μai :
Proposition 4.16. For every APE-structure F = (A, (μi )i ∈Ag) and every event structure E over A,
μai is an i-premeasure over A. Furthermore, if a ≤ y, then μai (x ) = μai (x ∧ y).
Proof. See Appendix A, page 44. 
Remark 9. Notice that if a ≤ y, then for every b ∈ mb(a), we have b ≤ y, thus μi (x ∧ y ∧ a) =
μi (x ∧ a) and μi (x ∧ y ∧ b) = μi (x ∧ b), which implies that μai (x ) = μai (x ∧ y).
Definition 4.17 (Intermediate Structure). For any APE-structure F = (A, (μi )i ∈Ag) and any event











′ is defined as in Definition 4.12;
(2) each μ ′i is defined as follows:
μ ′i : Mini (A






Pi (e ) · μai ( f (e )) · pre(e | a).
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Proposition 4.18. For every APE-structure F and every event structure E over the support of F ,
the intermediate structure
∏
E F is an ApPE-structure (see Definition 4.7). Furthermore, if
∨
a∈Φ a ≤
y, then μ ′i (x ) = μ
′
i (x ∧ y).
Proof. Proposition 4.13 states that
∏
EA is an epistemic Heyting algebra. To prove that
∏
E F
is an ApPE-structure, it remains to show that for every i ∈ Ag, the map μ ′i is an i-premeasure (see
items (1–4) of Definition 4.6). Fix i ∈ Ag. The map μ ′i is clearly well defined. Since the maps {μai }a∈Φ
are i-premeasures, the items (1), (2), and (4) are trivially true.
Proof of item 3. By Proposition 4.14, i-minimal elements of A′ are of the form fe,b : E → A
for some e ∈ E and some i-minimal element b ∈ Mini (A). Fix one such element fe,b ∈ Mini (A′),
and let д,h : E → A such that д,h ≤ fe,b . By definition, f ≤ fe,b can be rewritten as f (e ′) ≤
fe,b (e
′) for any e ′ ∈ E. Since fe,b (e ′) = ⊥ for any e ′ i e , we can deduce that д(e ′) = h(e ′) = ⊥
for any e ′ i e . Similarly, we can deduce that д(e ′) ≤ b and h(e ′) ≤ b for any e ′ ∼i e . Hence,













′) · (μai (д(e ′)) + μai (h(e ′)) − μai (д(e ′) ∧ h(e ′))) · pre(e ′ | a)
(μai is an i-premeasure, b ∈ Mini (A), and д(e ′) ≤ b and h(e ′) ≤ b for any e ′ ∈ E)
= μ ′i (д) + μ
′
i (h) − μ ′i (д ∧ h). (by definition)
Finally, the fact that if (
∨
a∈Φ a) ≤ y, then μ ′i (x ) = μ ′i (x ∧ y) follows from Proposition 4.16. 
4.4.3 The Intermediate Algebra for the Classical Case. Here, we show that the construction de-
scribed above, applied to the complex algebras of classical models, dualizes the construction of the
intermediate model of Section 2.2. This is the first step towards the result stated in Proposition 3.2.
Definition 4.19. For any PES-model M = 〈S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]〉 (see Definition 2.2) and any
probabilistic event structure E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre) over L (see Definition 2.4), let the
probabilistic event structure over M+ (see Definitions 3.1 and 4.11) be
EE := (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,ΦM, preM),
where
• ΦM = (ΦM,≺M) is the ordered multiset such that ΦM := {[[ϕ]]M | ϕ ∈ Φ} and the strict
order ≺M is the empty relation;
• the map preM : ΦM → (E → [0, 1]) assigns a probability distribution preM (•|[[ϕ]]) : E →
[0, 1] over E for every ϕ ∈ Φ such that:
preM (•|[[ϕ]]) : E → [0, 1] (4.4)
e → pre(e | ϕ).
Proposition 4.20. For any PES-model M (see Definition 2.2) and any event structure E over L
(see Definition 2.4), the tuple EE is an event structure over the epistemic Heyting algebra underlying
M+.
Proof. We need to verify that the tuple EE satisfies Definition 4.11. Items (1)–(3) are trivially
satisfied. Hence, we only need to prove that
(4) ΦM = (ΦM,≺M) is a finite ordered multiset on M+ such that, for all a,b ∈ ΦM that arise
from distinct elements in M+, either
a ∧M+ b = ⊥ or a <M+ b or b <M+ a;
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(5) the map preM : E × ΦM → [0, 1] assigns a probability distribution preM (•|a) over E for
every a ∈ ΦM;
(6) for all a ∈ Φ and e ∈ E, if preM (e |a) = 0, then preM (e |b) = 0 for all b ∈ Φ such that a ≺ b.
Proof of 4. First, we need to prove that ΦM is an ordered multiset (Definition 4.10). ΦM is
clearly a multiset, hence, we only need to prove that the empty relation ≺M satisfies the following
conditions: for all pairwise distinct elements x ,y, z ∈ ΦM,
(i) if x ≺M y, then x ≤M+ y;
(ii) if x  ⊥M+ and x ≤M+ y, then x ≺M y or y ≺M x ;
(iii) if x ≺M y and x ≺M z, then y ≺M z or z ≺M y.
Conditions (i) and (iii) are trivially satisfied. Notice that, since E is a (classical) probabilistic event
structure, Φ is a finite set of pairwise inconsistent L-formulas. Assume that [[ϕ]], [[ψ ]] ∈ ΦM are
pairwise distinct (i.e., ϕ  ψ in the language L) and such that [[ϕ]] ≤M+ [[ψ ]]. One can easily verify
that ϕ ∧ψ = ⊥ implies that [[ϕ]] = ⊥M+ . Hence, ≺M satisfies condition (ii). This finishes the proof
that the ordered multiset ΦM is well defined.
Let [[ϕ]], [[ψ ]] ∈ ΦM arise from distinct elements in M+. By definition, ϕ ∧ψ = ⊥. Hence, a ∧M+
b = ⊥, which proves item 4.
Proof of 5. Since E is a (classical) probabilistic event structure, pre assigns a probability
distribution pre(•|ϕ) over E for every ϕ ∈ Φ. Hence, the map preM is well defined.
Proof of 6. Since ≺M is the empty relation, this condition is trivially true. 
Remark 10. Notice that, in the classical case, mb(a) = ∅ for all a ∈ Φ. Indeed, mb(a) denotes
the multiset of the ≺-maximal elements of Φ ≺-below a. But, since in the classical case ≺M is the
empty relation, there is no element below a in Φ.










Proof. See Appendix A, page 44. 




+ of the intermediate structure
∐
EM is an ApPE-structure.
4.5 The Pseudo-quotient and the Updated APE-structure
In the present subsection, we define the APE-structure F E, resulting from the update of the APE-
structure F with the event structure E over the support of F , by taking a suitable pseudo-quotient
of the intermediate APE-structure
∏
E F . Some of the results that are relevant for the ensuing
treatment (such as the characterization of the i-minimal elements in the pseudo-quotient) are in-
dependent of the fact that we will be working with the intermediate algebra. Therefore, in what
follows, we will discuss them in the more general setting of arbitrary epistemic Heyting algebrasA.
Structure of the Subsection. First, we define the pseudo-quotient algebra (Definition 4.23) and
prove that it is an epistemic Heyting algebra (Proposition 4.24). Then, we characterize the i-
minimal elements of the pseudo-quotient algebra (Proposition 4.27). Finally, we define the APE-
structure F E, resulting from the update of the APE-structure F with the event structure E (Def-
inition 4.28 and Proposition 4.30) and show that this definition is compatible with the update on
PES-models (Lemma 4.32).
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Pseudo-quotient Algebra.
Definition 4.23 (Pseudo-Quotient Algebra). (cf. Reference [36, Sections 3.2, 3.3]) For any epistemic
Heyting algebra A := (L, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag), and any a ∈ A, let the pseudo-quotient algebra be
Aa := (L/a , (♦ai )i ∈Ag, (ai )i ∈Ag),
where
• a is defined as follows: for all b, c ∈ L,
b a c iff b ∧ a = c ∧ a,
• for every i ∈ Ag, the operations ♦ai and ai are defined as follows:
♦ai : Aa → Aa and ai : Aa → Aa
b → [♦i (b ∧ a)] b → [i (a → b)],
where [c] denotes the a-equivalence class of c ∈ A.
Proposition 4.24. (cf. Reference [36, Fact 12]) For any epistemic Heyting algebra A, the pseudo-
quotient algebra Aa (see Definition 4.23) is an epistemic Heyting algebra.
Proof. The proof that Aa is a monadic Heyting algebra can be found in Reference [36, Fact
12]. To show that Aa is an epistemic Heyting algebra (see Definition 4.3), it remains to prove
that ♦ai [b] ∨ ¬♦ai [b] = [] for all i ∈ Ag and b ∈ Aa . We have that ♦ai [b] = [♦i (b ∧ a)] and that
¬♦ai [b] = ¬[♦i (b ∧ a)] = [¬♦i (b ∧ a)]. Hence,
♦ai [b] ∨ ¬♦ai [b] = [♦i (b ∧ a) ∨ ¬♦i (b ∧ a)] = [],
since A is an epistemic Heyting algebra. 
The i-minimal Elements of the Pseudo-quotient Algebra.
Lemma 4.25. For any epistemic Heyting algebra A and any a ∈ A, if b ∈ Mini (A) and b ∧ a  ⊥,
then [b] ∈ Mini (Aa ).
Proof. Fix some b ∈ Mini (A) such that b ∧ a  ⊥. We need to prove that [b] ∈ Aa satisfies
items (1), (2), and (3) of Definition 4.2.
Proof of item 1. By assumption, [b]  ⊥, hence [b] satisfies item (1).
Proof of item 2. To show that ♦ai [b] = [b], it is enough to show that ♦i (b ∧ a) ∧ a = b ∧ a.
Clearly, b ∧ a ≤ b implies that ♦i (b ∧ a) ∧ a ≤ ♦ib ∧ a = b ∧ a, making use that ♦ib = b. Con-
versely, recalling that ♦i is reflexive (Definition 4.1, axiom (M1)), we have b ∧ a = (b ∧ a) ∧ a ≤
♦i (b ∧ a) ∧ a. Hence, ♦ai [b] = [b].
Proof of item 3. We need to prove that [b] is a minimal fixed point of ♦ai . Let [⊥]  [c] ≤
[b] such that ♦ai [c] = [c], and let us show that [c] = [b]. It is enough to show that c ∧ a = b ∧ a.
The assumption that [c] ≤ [b] implies that c ∧ a ≤ b ∧ a ≤ b. Hence, ♦i (c ∧ a) ≤ ♦ib = b. Notice
that the assumption that ♦i is transitive (Definition 4.1, axiom (M6)) implies that ♦i♦i (c ∧ a) =
♦i (c ∧ a); that is, ♦i (c ∧ a) is a fixed point of ♦i . Moreover, ⊥  c ∧ a ≤ ♦i (c ∧ a) implies that
♦i (c ∧ a)  ⊥. Hence, by the i-minimality of b in A, we conclude that ♦i (c ∧ a) = b, and hence
♦i (c ∧ a) ∧ a = b ∧ a. Moreover, the assumption that ♦ai [c] = [c] implies that ♦i (c ∧ a) ∧ a = c ∧
a. Thus, the following chain of identities holds c ∧ a = ♦i (c ∧ a) ∧ a = b ∧ a, as required. 
Lemma 4.26. For any epistemic Heyting algebra A and any a ∈ A, if [b] ∈ Mini (Aa ), then ♦i (b ∧
a) is the unique i-minimal element of A which belongs to [b].
Proof. See Appendix A, page 44. 
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Combining the two lemmas above, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4.27. The following are equivalent for any A and any a ∈ A:
(1) [b] ∈ Mini (Aa );
(2) [b] = [b ′] for a unique b ′ ∈ Mini (A) such that b ′ ∧ a  ⊥.
Notation 3. In what follows, whenever [b] ∈ Mini (Aa ), we will assume w.l.o.g. that b ∈ Mini (A)
is the “canonical” (in the sense of Proposition 4.27) representant of [b].
The Updated APE-structure. For any APE-structure F and any event structure E over the sup-
port A of F , the map pre in E induces the map pre defined as follows:






It immediately follows from Propositions 4.14 and 4.27 that the i-minimal elements of AE are
exactly the elements [fe,b ] for e ∈ E and b ∈ Mini (A) such that b ∧ pre (e ′)  ⊥ for some e ′ ∼i e .
Definition 4.28 (Updated APE-Structure). For any APE-structure F and any event structure E










(1) AE is obtained by instantiating Definition 4.23 to
∏









(2) The maps μEi are defined as follows:
μEi : Mini (A
E)↓ → [0, 1]
[д] →
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩




where [f] is the only element in Mini (AE) such that [д] ≤ [f ].5
Lemma 4.29. For any APE-structure F and any event structure E over the support of F , the maps
(μEi )i ∈Ag of the updated APE-structure F E := (AE, (μEi )i ∈Ag) are well defined.
Proof. Let us first prove the following claim: 
Claim 1. For each [h] ∈ Mini (AE)↓ such that [h]  ⊥, we have μ ′i ([h])  0.
Proof of claim. Let e ∈ E be such that (h ∧ pre ) (e )  ⊥. Notice that





This implies that there is a ∈ Φ such that
pre(e | a) > 0 and h(e ) ∧ a  ⊥.
5See Definition 4.17 for the definition of the maps (μ′i )i∈Ag.
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Since μi is an i-measure (see Definition 4.6), we have μi ((h ∧ a) (e )) > 0. Then, the following set is
non-empty
{a ∈ Φ | μi ((h ∧ a) (e )) > 0 and pre(e |a) > 0}.
Since Φ is finite, it is well founded with respect to the order of the multiset ≺, hence, it contains
at least one minimal element. Let a0 be such a minimal element. From item (6) of Definition 4.11,
we deduce that, for every b ∈ Φ such that b ≺ a0, it is the case that pre(e |b) > 0. The minimality
of a0 implies that, for every b ∈ Φ such that b ≺ a0, we have μi ((h ∧ b) (e )) = 0. This implies that,
for all b ∈ mb(a), we have μi ((h ∧ b) (e )) = 0. Hence,
μa0i (h(e )) = μi (д(e ) ∧ a0) −
∑
b ∈mb(a0 )
μi (h(e ) ∧ b) (see Definition 4.15)
= μi (h(e ) ∧ a0).
Therefore, μa0i (h(e )) > 0 and Pi (e ) · μ
a0
i (h(e )) · pre(e |a0) > 0. This guarantees that μ ′i ([h])  0.
This finishes the proof of the claim. 
Now, let us prove that the map μEi is well defined. Recall that, if [д]  ⊥, then [f ] is unique
(see Remark 3). From the claim above, it follows that the division
μ′i (д)
μ′i (f )
is defined. Finally, let us
verify that μEi assigns exactly one value to every [д] ∈ Mini (AE)↓. Let д1,д2 ∈ [д]. Then, we have
μ ′i (д1) = μ
′
i (д1 ∧ pre ) = μ ′i (д2 ∧ pre ) = μ ′i (д2) (see Proposition 4.18). Since μ ′i is order-preserving,
strictly positive for [f ]  ⊥ and μEi ([д]) =
μ′i (д)
μ′i (f )







≤ 1. Hence, μEi is well defined for any i ∈ Ag.
Proposition 4.30. For any APE-structure F and any event structure E over the support of F , the
tuple F E = (AE, (μEi )i ∈Ag) is an APE-structure.
Proof. See Appendix A, page 44. 
The Updated Algebra for the Classical Case. In this section, we conclude the proof of Proposi-
tion 3.2 by showing that the pseudo-quotient construction described above, applied to the complex
algebras of the intermediate classical models, dualizes the submodel construction in Section 2.2.
The definition of the complex algebra of a PES-model (Definition 3.1) can be equivalently refor-
mulated as follows:
Definition 4.31 (Complex Algebra). For any PES-model M = 〈S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]〉, its com-
plex algebra is the tuple
M+ := (PS, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag, (P+i )i ∈Ag),
where
(1) for each i ∈ Ag and X ∈ PS ,
♦iX = {s ∈ S | ∃x (s ∼i x and x ∈ X )},
iX = {s ∈ S | ∀x (s ∼i x ⇒ x ∈ X )},
(2) A := 〈PS, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag〉 is an epistemic Heyting algebra,
(3) for each i ∈ Ag and X ∈ PS ,





Notice that the domain of P+i consists of all the subsets of the equivalence classes of ∼i .
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Lemma 4.32. For any PES-model M and any event structure E over L,
(P+i )
EE  (P Ei )
+.
Proof. See Appendix A, page 44. 
5 INTUITIONISTIC PDEL
In this section, we introduce the Intuitionistic Probabilistic Dynamic Epistemic Logic (IPDEL). We
define its syntax in Section 5.1 and its algebraic semantics (Definition 5.6) in Section 5.2. Then,
in Section 5.3, we introduce the axiomatization of IPDEL (Table 2) and state its soundness and
completeness. For the proofs, see Appendices B and C.
5.1 The Language of IPDEL
Definition 5.1 (IPDEL Language). The set L of IPDEL-formulas φ and the class of intuitionistic
probabilistic event structures E over L are built by simultaneous recursion as follows:
φ ::= p | ⊥ | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | φ → φ | ♦iφ | iφ | 〈E, e〉φ | [E, e]φ | 
n∑
k=1
αk μi (φ) ≥ β,
where i ∈ Ag, and, following Reference [20], we let αk , β be rational numbers, and the event struc-
tures E are as in Definition 5.2.
The connectives , ¬, and↔ are defined by the usual abbreviations.
Definition 5.2 (Intuitionistic Probabilistic Event Structure). An intuitionistic probabilistic event
structure over L is a tuple
E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub),
such that
• E is a non-empty finite set;
• each ∼i is an equivalence relation on E;
• each Pi : E → ]0, 1] assigns a probability distribution over each ∼i -equivalence class, i.e.,∑ {
Pi (e
′) | e ′ ∼i e
}
= 1;
• Φ is a finite set of formulas in L such that, for all ϕk ,ϕ j ∈ Φ, one and only one of the
following conditions is true:
–  (ϕ j ∧ ϕk ) → ⊥,
–  ϕk → ϕ j ,
–  ϕ j → ϕk ;
• the map pre : E × Φ→ [0, 1] assigns a probability distribution pre(•|ϕ) over E for every
ϕ ∈ Φ;
• the map sub : E → SubL assigns a substitution function (see Definition 2.3) to each event
in E;
• for all ϕ j ∈ Φ and e ∈ E, if pre(e |ϕ j ) = 0, then pre(e |ϕk ) = 0 for all ϕk ∈ Φ such that  ϕ j →
ϕk .
Remark 11. The conditions on Φ match the conditions of Φ given in Definition 4.11 (cf. Defi-
nition 5.4). The requirement in Definition 4.11 that Φ is a multiset stems from the fact that the
interpretation of distinct formulas ϕk ,ϕ j such that ϕk → ϕ j might coincide in a model.
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Remark 12. The conditions on the preconditions are given using . One should refer to Sec-
tion 5.3 and Table 2 for the axiomatization of IPDEL.
5.2 Algebraic Semantics
In what follows, we define the models, the event structures on the language, the event structures
on the model, the updated models, and the semantics. Notice that the definition of the event struc-
ture on the model relies on the definition of the event structure on the language, and that the
definitions of the event structure on the model, the updated models, and the semantics are given
by simultaneous induction.
Definition 5.3 (APE-Models). Algebraic probabilistic epistemic models (APE-models) are tuples
M = 〈F ,v〉 such that F =
(
A, (μi )i ∈Ag
)
is an APE-structure and v : AtProp→ A.
The update construction of Section 4 extends from APE-structures to APE-models. Indeed, for
any APE-model M = 〈A, (μi )i ∈Ag,v〉 and any event structure E (see Definition 5.2), the event
structure E induces an event structure over the algebra A (see Definition 4.11) as follows:
Definition 5.4. For any APE-modelM = 〈A, (μi )i ∈Ag,v〉 and any event structure
E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub),
over L, the following tuple is an event structure over A:
EE := (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,ΦM , preM ),
where
• Φ := (ΦM ,≺M ) with ΦM := {[[ϕ]]M | ϕ ∈ Φ} and ≺M := {([[ϕ j ]], [[ϕk ]]) |  ϕ j → ϕk }, and
• preM assigns a probability distribution preM (•|a) over E for every a ∈ ΦM .
It is straightforward to verify that EE defined above is an event structure.
Definition 5.5 (Updated Model). The update of the APE-modelM = 〈F ,v〉 by the intuitionistic
probabilistic event structure E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub) is given by the APE-model
ME := 〈F E ,vE〉,
where
• F E := F EE as in Definition 4.28,
• and the map vE is defined as follows:





















e → v (p) e → v (sub(e ) (p)).
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A→ A and π :
∏
EE




д → д(e ) д → [д] [д] → д ∧ pre .
As explained in Reference [36, Section 3.2], the map ι is well defined.
Definition 5.6 (Semantics). The interpretation of L-formulas on any APE-modelM is defined
recursively as follows:
[[⊥]]M = ⊥A [[]]M = A
[[p]]M = v (p) [[φ → ψ ]]M = [[φ]]M →A [[ψ ]]M
[[φ ∧ψ ]]M = [[φ]]M ∧A [[ψ ]]M [[φ ∨ψ ]]M = [[φ]]M ∨A [[ψ ]]M
[[♦iφ]]M = ♦i [[φ]]M [[iφ]]M = i [[φ]]M
[[〈E, e〉φ]]M = [[pre (e )]]M ∧A πe ◦ ι ([[φ]]MEE ) [[[E, e]φ]]M = [[pre (e )]]M →




αk μi (φk ) ≥ β
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ M =
∨ ⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩a ∈ A
 a ∈ Mini (A) and 
n∑
k=1
αk μi ([[φk ]]M ∧ a) ≥ β
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ .
5.3 Axiomatization
IPDEL is intended as the intuitionistic counterpart of classical PDEL. The full axiomatization of
IPDEL is given in Table 2 (see page 26). This axiomatization differs from the one of classical PDEL
(cf. Table 1) in that the axioms for S5 are replaced by the axioms of intuitionistic modal logic
MIPC and axiom E (see Definition 4.3), and the axioms capturing classical probability theory are
replaced by axioms capturing intuitionistic probability theory. In particular, axioms p3 and p4 in
Table 1 are different from the axioms P3 and P4 in Table 2. It is not hard to see that axiom p3
implies P3 and μi (φ) + μi (¬φ) = 1 in the presence of p1 and p2. Axiom P3 is strictly weaker than
p3, since the aforementioned equality is generally false for intuitionistic probabilities. Axioms p4
and P4 are classically equivalent. In intuitionistic logic, P4 is strictly stronger than p4. Indeed,
as Lemma 5.8 shows, p4 is not strong enough to express the strict monotonicity of i-measures.
Finally, notice that axioms M8 and M9 from Definition 4.1 are not in Table 2. Indeed, they follow
from the remaining axioms and the necessitation rules (see Lemma 5.7 and also compare with
Reference [11]). Compared to classical PDEL, the greater number of reduction axioms reflects the
fact that, in the intuitionistic setting, connectives are not interdefinable. However, of course the
intuitionistic reduction axioms are classically derivable and serve the same purpose as the classical
reduction axioms, namely to reduce the completeness of IPDEL to the completeness of its “static”
fragment.
Lemma 5.7. Axioms M8 and M9 from Definition 4.1 are derivable from rules and axioms in Table 2.
Proof. Axiom M9 (i.e.,  ≤ i) is a direct consequence of the necessitation rule. Axiom M8
(i.e., ♦i⊥ ≤ ⊥) can be derived as follows: by instantiating axiom M6 with ⊥, one gets ♦ii⊥ →
i⊥; by instantiating axiom M2 with ⊥, one gets i⊥ → ⊥; since, in addition, ⊥ → i⊥ (axiom
H9), one gets that i⊥ ↔ ⊥; by substitution of logical equivalence (rule SubEq) in ♦ii⊥ → i⊥,
one gets ♦i⊥ → ⊥, as required. 
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Table 2. Axioms of IPDEL
Axioms of IPL
H1. A→ (B → A) H2. (A→ (B → C )) → ((A→ B ) → (A→ C ))
H3. A→ (B → A ∧ B ) H4. (A→ C ) → ((B → C ) → (A ∨ B → C ))
H5. A ∧ B → A H6. A ∧ B → B
H7. A→ A ∨ B H8. B → A ∨ B
H9. ⊥ → A
Axioms for static modalities
M1. p → ♦i p M2. i p → p
M3. ♦i (p ∨ q ) → ♦i p ∨ ♦i q M4. i (p → q ) → (i p → i q )
M5. ♦i p → i♦i p M6. ♦ii p → i p
M7. i (p → q ) → (♦i p → ♦i q ) E. ♦i p ∨ ¬♦i p
Axioms for inequalities
N0. t ≥ t N1. (t ≥ β ) ↔ (t + 0 · μi (φ ) ≥ β )
N2.
(∑n




k=1 αρ (k ) · μi (φρ (k ) ) ≥ β
)
for any permutation ρ over {1, . . . , n }
N3.
(∑n











k=1 (αk + α
′
k
) · μi (φk ) ≥ (β + β ′)
)
N4. ((t ≥ β ) ∧ (d ≥ 0)) → (d · t ≥ d · β ) N5. (t ≥ β ) ∨ (β ≥ t )
N6. (t ≥ β ) → (t > γ ) for all γ < β
Axioms for Intuitionistic Probabilities
P1. μi (⊥) = 0 P2. μi () = 1
P3. μi (φ ) + μi (ψ ) = μi (φ ∨ψ ) + μi (φ ∧ψ ) P4. ((i (φ → ψ )) ∧ (μi (φ ) = μi (ψ ))) ↔ i (ψ ↔ φ )
P5.
(∑n




k=1 αk · μi (φk ) ≥ β
)
Reduction Axioms
I1. [E, e] p ↔ pr e (e ) → sub(e, p ) I2. 〈E, e〉p ↔ pr e (e ) ∧ sub(e, p )
I3. [E, e] ↔  I4. 〈E, e〉 ↔ pr e (e )
I5. [E, e]⊥ ↔ ¬pr e (e ) I6. 〈E, e〉⊥ ↔ ⊥
I7. [E, e] (ψ1 ∧ψ2) ↔ [E, e]ψ1 ∧ [E, e]ψ2 I8. 〈E, e〉(ψ1 ∧ψ2) ↔ 〈E, e〉ψ1 ∧ 〈E, e〉ψ2
I9. [E, e] (ψ1 ∨ψ2) ↔ pr e (e ) →
〈E, e〉ψ1 ∨ 〈E, e〉ψ2
I10. 〈E, e〉(ψ1 ∨ψ2) ↔ 〈E, e〉ψ1 ∨ 〈E, e〉ψ2
I11. [E, e] (ψ1 → ψ2) ↔ 〈E, e〉ψ1 → 〈E, e〉ψ2 I12. 〈E, e〉(ψ1 → ψ2) ↔ pr e (e ) ∧ (〈E, e〉ψ1 →
〈E, e〉ψ2 )
I13. [E, e]♦iψ ↔ pr e (e ) →
∨
e′∼i e ♦i (〈E, e′〉ψ ) I14. 〈E, e〉♦iψ ↔ pr e (e ) ∧
∨
e′∼i e ♦i (〈E, e′〉ψ )
I15. [E, e]iψ ↔ pr e (e ) →
∧
e′∼i e i ([E, e
′]ψ ) I16. 〈E, e〉iψ ↔ pr e (e ) ∧
∧
e′∼i e i ([E, e
′]ψ )







′)pre(e′ | ϕ )μϕi ([E, e















i (ψ ) := μi (ψ ∧ ϕ ) −
∑
σ ∈mb(ϕ ) μi (ψ ∧ σ ) and mb(ϕ ) := max→ Φ∩↓ϕ .
Inference Rules
MP. if  A→ B and  A, then  B
Neci if  A, then  i A Necα if  A, then  [E, e]A
Subμ if  A→ B , then  μi (A) ≤ μi (B ) SubEq if  A↔ B , then  ϕ ↔ ϕ[A/B]
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Lemma 5.8. Axiom P4 in Table 2 implies axiom p4 in Table 1. In classical logic, the two formulas
are equivalent in the context of the rest of the axioms. Finally, there exists an ApPE-structure that
validates axiom p4 but doesn’t validate axiom P4.
Proof. Recall that
(P4) ((i (ϕ → ψ )) ∧ (μi (ϕ) = μi (ψ ))]) ↔ i (ψ ↔ ϕ),
(p4) iφ ↔ (μi (φ) = 1).
That P4 implies p4 follows immediately by replacing ψ with . Now, let us prove that p4 implies
P4 in classical logic. We first show that p4 implies i (ψ ↔ ϕ) → ((i (ϕ → ψ )) ∧ (μi (ϕ) = μi (ψ ))])
as follows:
i (ψ ↔ ϕ) ⇔ μi (ψ ↔ ϕ) = 1 (Axiom p4)
⇔ μi ((¬ψ ∨ ϕ) ∧ (¬ϕ ∨ψ )) = 1 (classical logic equivalence)
Notice that
(¬ψ ∨ ϕ) ∧ (¬ϕ ∨ψ ) → (¬ψ ∨ ϕ) (5.1)
(¬ψ ∨ ϕ) ∧ (¬ϕ ∨ψ ) → (¬ϕ ∨ψ )/ (5.2)
Hence, using the rule Subμ : if  A→ B, then  μi (A) ≤ μi (B), the equality μi ((¬ψ ∨ ϕ) ∧ (¬ϕ ∨
ψ )) = 1, and the Equations (5.1) and (5.2), one can prove that
(μi (¬ψ ∨ ϕ) = 1) ∧ (μi (¬ϕ ∨ψ ) = 1).
Using p4, we can derive that i (ϕ → ϕ). It remains to derive that μi (ψ ) = μi (ϕ) as follows:
(μi (¬ψ ∨ ϕ) = 1) ∧ (μi (¬ϕ ∨ψ ) = 1)
⇒ (μi (¬(¬ψ ∨ ϕ)) = 0) ∧ (μi (¬ϕ ∨ψ ) = 1) (μi (φ) = 1 − μi (¬φ) in PDEL, see Table 1)
⇒ (μi (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) = 0) ∧ (μi (¬ϕ ∨ψ ) = 1) (De Morgan laws)
⇒ (μi (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) = 0) ∧ (μi (¬ϕ) + μi (ψ ) − μi (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) = 1)
(μi (φ) + μi (ψ ) = μi (φ ∨ψ ) + μi (φ ∧ψ ) in PDEL, see Table 1)
⇒ μi (¬ϕ) + μi (ψ ) = 1
⇒ μi (¬ϕ) + μi (ψ ) = μi (ϕ) + μi (¬ϕ) (μi (ϕ) + μi (¬ϕ) = 1 in PDEL, by axioms p2 and p3)
⇒ μi (ψ ) = μi (ϕ).
Now, we show that p4 implies ((i (ϕ → ψ )) ∧ (μi (ϕ) = μi (ψ ))]) → i (ψ ↔ ϕ) as follows:
i (ϕ → ψ ) ∧ (μi (ϕ) = μi (ψ ))
⇒ (μi (¬ϕ ∨ψ ) = 1) ∧ (μi (ϕ) = μi (ψ )) (Axiom p4)
⇒ (μi (¬ϕ) + μi (ψ ) − μi (¬ϕ ∧ψ ) = 1) ∧ (μi (ϕ) = μi (ψ ))
(μi (φ) + μi (ψ ) = μi (φ ∨ψ ) + μi (φ ∧ψ ) in PDEL)
⇒ (μi (¬ϕ) + μi (ψ ) − μi (¬ϕ ∧ψ ) = 1) ∧ (μi (¬ϕ) = μi (¬ψ )) (μi (ϕ) + μi (¬ϕ) = 1 in PDEL)
⇒ (μi (¬ψ ) + μi (ψ ) − μi (¬ϕ ∧ψ ) = 1)
⇒ (1 − μi (¬ϕ ∧ψ ) = 1) (μi (ϕ) + μi (¬ϕ) = 1 in PDEL)
⇒ (μi (¬ϕ ∧ψ ) = 0) (μi (ϕ) + μi (¬ϕ) = 1 in PDEL)
⇒ (μi (ϕ ∨ ¬ψ ) = 1) (μi (ϕ) + μi (¬ϕ) = 1 in PDEL)
⇒ (μi (ψ → ϕ) = 1)
⇒ i (ψ → ϕ) (Axiom p4)
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Fig. 1. Heyting algebra H.
This concludes the proof that in classical logic p4 and P4 are equivalent. Finally, consider the
Heyting algebra H in Figure 1 with
♦x :=
{
 if x  ⊥,
⊥ if x = ⊥ x :=
{
⊥ if x  ,
 if x = 
and μ (⊥) = 0, μ (a) = 0.5, μ (b) = 0.5 and μ () = 1.
It is easy to see that the Heyting algebra in Figure 1 satisfies all axioms of IPDEL except for P4
and it satisfies p4. It falsifies P4, because ((a → b)) ∧ (μ (a) = μ (b)) = , while(a ↔ b) = ⊥. 
Theorem 5.9 (Soundness). The axiomatization for IPDEL given in Table 2 is sound w.r.t. APE-
models.
Theorem 5.10 (Completeness). The axiomatization for IPDEL given in Table 2 is weakly complete
w.r.t. APE-models.
The proof of soundness is given in Appendix B, and the proof of completeness is given in
Appendix C.
6 RELATIONAL SEMANTICS
In this section, we introduce the finite relational semantics of IPDEL as the dual structures of epis-
temic Heyting algebras within the duality between monadic Heyting algebras and MIPC-frames
(cf. References [12, 34]). Specifically, we specialize this duality6 by identifying the condition cor-
responding to axiom E. Moreover, we present a dual correspondence between the probability dis-
tributions on intuitionistic Kripke frames and measures on epistemic Heyting algebras. This cor-
respondence appears in Reference [23] in the context of finite GBL-algebras. Furthermore, we
generalize the model-theoretic constructions presented in Section 2.2 for the Boolean setting and
show that they dually correspond to the constructions presented in Section 4. Finally, notice that
these results readily imply the completeness and the finite model property of IPDEL with respect
to this class of relational structures via the algebraic completeness presented in Appendix C.
Structure of This Section. In Section 6.1, we introduce the epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frames
as the class of relational structures dually corresponding to epistemic Heyting algebras. In Sec-
tion 6.2, we introduce the probability distributions associated with any agent i and prove that each
dually corresponds to an i-measure. In Section 6.3, we introduce the construction of intermediate
epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frames and prove that it dually corresponds to the construction of
intermediate epistemic Heyting algebras presented in Section 4.4. In Section 6.4, we define the dual
construction to the pseudo-quotient defined in 4.5. Finally, in Section 6.5, we use this construction
to define the interpretation of IPDEL-formulas on IPDEL-models.
6Because we consider only finite algebras and finite relational structures, we can dispense with the topology.
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6.1 Epistemic Heyting Algebras and Epistemic Intuitionistic Kripke Frames
We first recall the definition on the objects of the duality between finite monadic Heyting algebras
and MIPC-frames.7 We then identify the MIPC-frames corresponding to epistemic intuitionistic
Kripke frames and show that their dual algebras exactly correspond to epistemic Heyting algebras.
Definition 6.1 (Finite MIPC-Frames). A finite MIPC-frame is a tuple
F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉
such that (S, ≤) is a finite poset and each Ri is an equivalence relation on S such that
(Ri◦ ≥) ⊆ (≥ ◦ Ri ) Ri = (≥ ◦ Ri ) ∩ (Ri◦ ≤).
Notation 5. For any poset (S, ≤) and any set X ⊆ S , we define the down-set and the up-set gen-
erated by X as
X↓ = {w ∈ S | ∃v ∈ X ,w ≤ v} and X↑ = {w ∈ S | ∃v ∈ X ,w ≥ v},
respectively. We let P↓(S ) = {X↓ | X ⊆ S } be the set of all downsets of S .
Definition 6.2 (Complex Algebra of a Finite MIPC-Frame). For any finite MIPC-frame F = 〈S, ≤,
(Ri )i ∈Ag〉, let its complex algebra be:
F+ = (P↓(S ),∧,∨,→, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag,⊥)
where
X ∧ Y := X ∩ Y , (6.1)
X ∨ Y := X ∪ Y , (6.2)
X → Y := S \ ((X ∩ (S \ Y )) ↑), (6.3)
♦iX := R−1i [X ], (6.4)
iX := S \ (≥ ◦ Ri )−1[S \ X ], (6.5)
⊥ := ∅. (6.6)
We also use the standard notation
 := S, (6.7)
¬X := X → ⊥ = S \ X↑ . (6.8)
Definition 6.3 (MIPC Frame Associated to a Finite Monadic Heyting Algebra). For any finite
monadic Heyting algebra8 A = (L, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag), let its associated frame be:
A+ = 〈J (A), ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉,
where
• J (A) is the set of join-irreducible elements of A;
• ≤ ⊆ J (A) × J (A) is the order inherited from A, i.e., j ≤ j ′ iff j ≤A j ′ for all j, j ′ ∈ J (A);
• Ri ⊆ J (A) × J (A) is defined as follows: jRi j ′ if and only if ♦i j = ♦i j ′ for all j, j ′ ∈ J (A)
and every i ∈ Ag.
The following lemma is stated in Reference [34, Fact 4.5, Proposition 4.6] and Reference [12]:
Lemma 6.4. If F is a finite MIPC-frame, then F+ is a finite monadic Heyting algebra. If A is a finite
monadic Heyting algebra, then A+ is a finite MIPC-frame. Furthermore (F+)+  F and (A+)+  A.
7A complete exposition can be found in Reference [12].
8see Definition 4.1, page 11.
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Notation 6. Let η : A→ (A+)+ and ϵ : F → (F+)+ denote the natural isomorphisms inherited
from the object dualities (A+)+  A and (F+)+  F . (see Reference [19] for more details on η and ϵ .)
Definition 6.5 (Epistemic Intuitionistic Kripke Frame). An epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame is
a finite MIPC-frame F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉 such that, for every i ∈ Ag, the equivalence relation Ri is
upwards and downwards closed w.r.t. the order relation ≤.
The following lemma characterizes the dual spaces of epistemic Heyting algebras9:
Lemma 6.6. If A is an epistemic Heyting algebra, then A+ is an epistemic intuitionistic Kripke
frame. If F is an epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame, then F+ is an epistemic Heyting algebra.
Proof. Since, by definition, all epistemic Heyting algebras are finite monadic Heyting algebras,
it follows from Lemma 6.4 that their dual spaces are finite MIPC-frames.
Let A = (L, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag) and A+ = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉. By Lemma 6.4, it is enough to show
that the equivalence relations Ri are upwards and downwards closed. Since Ri is symmetric, it is
enough to show that Ri is upwards closed.
Assume, for contradiction, that the equivalence relation Ri is not upwards closed for some i ∈
Ag. Hence, there is at least one equivalence class defined by the relation Ri that is not upwards
closed. Since the empty set is upwards and downwards closed, this equivalence class is non-empty.
Let w ∈ S be an element of that class, let v ∈ S be such that v ≥ w and v  Ri [w], and let a be the
element of the dual algebra corresponding to the downset generated by w . Then, ♦ia = R−1i [w↓].
First, let us show that v  R−1i [w↓]. Heading towards a contradiction, let us assume that v ∈
R−1i [w↓]. This means that there exists z ∈ S such that z ≤ w and (v, z) ∈ Ri ; therefore, (v,w ) ∈
(Ri◦ ≤). Furthermore, we have that (v,w ) ∈ (≥ ◦ Ri ), because (w,w ) ∈ Ri and v ≥ w . Since
Ri = (≥ ◦ Ri ) ∩ (Ri◦ ≤), we deduce that (v,w ) ∈ Ri , which is a contradiction. This proves that
v  R−1i [w↓].
From (6.8), we have that ¬♦ia = S \ ((R−1[w↓])↑). By assumption,w ≤ v , hence,v ∈ (R−1[w↓])↑
and v  ¬♦ia. Hence, v  ♦ia ∨ ¬♦ia, and therefore axiom E does not hold, contradicting the
assumption that A is an epistemic Heyting algebra. Hence, Ri is upwards closed.
As to the second part of the statement, let F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉 and F+ = (L, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag).
By Lemma 6.4, it remains to prove that F+ satisfies axiom E (i.e., ♦ia ∨ ¬♦ia = ) for every i ∈
Ag. Since Ri is upwards closed for every i ∈ Ag, it follows that (R−1i [X↓])↑ = R−1i [X↓]. Therefore,
R−1i [X↓] ∪ (S \ ((R−1i [X↓])↑) = S , i.e., axiom E holds in F+, as required. 
Definition 6.7 (Epistemic Intuitionistic Kripke Model). An epistemic intuitionistic Kripke model is a
tuple M = 〈F ,V 〉 such that F is an epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame andV : AtProp→ P↓(S ).
Corollary 6.8. For any epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉, the i-minimal
elements of F+ are exactly the equivalence cells of Ri .
Proof. Recall (cf. Definition 4.2) that an element a ∈ F+ is i-minimal if
(1) a  ⊥,
(2) ♦ia = a, and
(3) if b ∈ F+, b < a, and ♦ib = b, then b = ⊥.
Let X ⊆ S be an Ri -equivalence cell of F . Hence, X is a non-empty set, which proves item (1).
Moreover, by definition of ♦ (see (6.4)), we have♦iX := R−1i [X ] = X , which proves item (2). Finally,
if ∅  Y ⊆ X then ♦iY = R−1i [Y ] = X , which proves item (3).
9see Definition 4.3, page 12.
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Let a ∈ F+ = P↓(S ) be an i-minimal element. To prove that a is an equivalence cell of Ri , we
need to show that a = R−1i [w] for somew ∈ S . By item (1), a  ∅; hence, there existsw ∈ a. Recall
that ♦iX := R−1i [X ] (see (6.4)). By item (2), a = ♦ia = R−1i [a]; hence, a is the union of equivalence
cells. By item (3), the only equivalence cell or union of equivalence cells smaller than a is the empty
set; hence, a contains exactly one equivalence cell. 
Corollary 6.9. For every epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉, and every
join-prime element j of F+, there exists some i-minimal element a such that j ≤ a.
Proof. If j is a join-prime element of F+, then j = w↓ for some w ∈ S . Let a = R−1i [w], which
is an i-minimal element by Corollary 6.8. Since the equivalence relation Ri is upwards and down-
wards closed for every i ∈ Ag, we have w↓ ⊆ R−1i [w], as required. 
6.2 Epistemic Intuitionistic Kripke Frames and Probabilities
In this section, we define i-probability distributions. Applying ideas of Reference [23] to the set-
ting of epistemic Heyting algebras, we define a correspondence between maps from epistemic
intuitionistic Kripke frames to non-negative reals and premeasures on epistemic Heyting algebras
(see Definition 4.6).
Definition 6.10 (i-Probability Distribution). Let F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉 be an epistemic intuitionistic
Kripke frame. An i-probability distribution over S is a map Pi : S → ]0, 1] such that
∑
w ∈X Pi (w ) = 1
for each equivalence cell X of Ri .
Lemma 6.11. For any epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉, any map f : S →
R+ defines the i-premeasure f + on F+ as follows:





Moreover, if f is an i-probability distribution, then the map f + is an i-measure (see Definition 4.6) on
F+.
Proof. This result directly follows from the definition of f + and Corollary 6.8. 
Definition 6.12. For any finite monadic Heyting algebra A = (L, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag) and any
i-premeasure μi on A, let
(μi )+ : J (A) → R+ (6.10)




It follows from the monotonicity of μi that (μi )+ is well defined.
Lemma 6.13. Let A be an epistemic Heyting algebra equipped with an i-premeasure μi . Let the map
η : A→ (A+)+ be the natural isomorphism (see Notation 6). Then, ((μi )+)+ (η(a)) = μi (a) for every
a ∈ A.
Proof. Notice that, by definition,
((μi )+)




(μi )+ (x ) =
∑
x ∈b
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Since A is a finite poset, we can define the height of its elements as follows: for every a ∈ A,
h(a) :=
{
0 if a = ⊥
max{h(b) | b < a} + 1 otherwise.
Notice that the only element of height 0 is ⊥. The proof will proceed by induction on the height
of the elements of A below the i-minimal elements.
As to the base case, it is immediate to see that ((μi )+)+ (η(⊥)) = ((μi )+)+ (∅) = μi (⊥) = 0.
As to the induction step, assume that μi (a) = ((μi )+)+ (η(a)) for all a ∈ Mini (A) such that h(a) ≤
n. Now, let b be such that h(b) = n + 1. If b is a join prime element of A, then η(b) = b↓ and by
definition (
∨
c<b c ) < b. This implies that h (
∨




c = ((μi )+)+ η 
∨
c<b






((μi )+) (x )
= ((μi )+) (b) +
∑
x ∈b↓\{b }
((μi )+) (x )
= ((μi )+) (b) + ((μi )+)
+ (b ↓ \{b})
= μi (b) − μi 
∨
c<b




= μi (b). (by induction hypothesis)
If b is not a join prime element, then it can be written as the union of elements strictly below
it. Since both μi and ((μi )+)+ satisfy condition (3) of Definition 4.6 and have the same values on
elements of height strictly smaller than n + 1, it follows that μi (b) = ((μi )+)+ (η(b)). 
Corollary 6.14. Let A be an epistemic Heyting algebra equipped with an i-measure μi :
Mini (A)↓ → R+. Then the map
(μi )+ : J (A) → ]0, 1] (6.11)




is an i-probability distribution over A+.
Proof. The map (μi )+ is well defined. Indeed, (μi )+ (b) is strictly positive for any b ∈ J (A), be-
cause μi is strictly monotone (see Definition 4.6, item 6) and (μi )+ (b) ≤ 1, because there exists an
i-minimal element a such that b ≤ a (see Corollary 6.9) and because μi (a) = 1 (see Definition 4.6,
item 5). Lemma 6.13 implies that 1 = μi (a) = ((μi )+)+ (a) =
∑
x ∈X (μi )+ (x ) for every i-minimal
element a, which shows that (μi )+ is an i-probability distribution over A+, as required. 
Lemma 6.15. Let F be an epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame equipped with a probability distri-
bution Pi . Let the map ϵ : F → (F+)+ be the natural isomorphism (see Notation 6). Then, ((Pi )+)+
(ϵ (w )) = Pi (w ) for every w ∈ F .
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Proof. For every join prime elementw↓ of F+, we have thatv ∈ w↓ if and only ifv ≤ w . Thus,
we obtain:
((Pi )
+)+ (ϵ (w )) = (Pi )






Pi (v ) −
∑
v<w
Pi (v ) = Pi (w ).

6.3 Dualizing the Product Updates of APE Structures
In this section, we introduce the generalization of the construction of the intermediate structure
presented in Section 2.2 and show that it dualizes the intermediate construction on algebras pre-
sented in Section 4.4.
Definition 6.16 (Intermediate Intuitionistic Structure). For any epistemic intuitionistic Kripke
model M = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag, [[·]]〉 and any intuitionistic probabilistic event structure E =
(E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub) over L (see Definition 5.2), let the intermediate intuitionistic













• ∐ |E | S  S × E is the |E |-fold coproduct of S ,




|E | S is defined as follows:
(s, e ) ≤
∐
i (s
′, e ′) iff s ≤i s ′ and e = e ′,








′, e ′) iff sRis
′ and e ∼i e ′,
• and the valuation [[·]]∐ : AtProp→ PS is defined by
[[p]]∐ := {(s, e ) | s ∈ [[p]]M} = [[p]]M × E
for every p ∈ AtProp.












Lemma 6.17. Let M = 〈F , [[·]]〉 be an epistemic intuitionistic Kripke model. Then (∐EF , [[·]]∐) is







Proof. Given Reference [34, Fact 4.8], Lemmas 6.4 and 6.6, it remains to show that each R
∐
i is
upwards closed. This follows from each Ri being upwards closed and the definition of ≤
∐
. 
Definition 6.18. For any epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉, any epis-
temic intuitionistic Kripke model M = 〈F , [[·]]〉, any i-probability distribution Pi on F (see Defini-
tion 6.10), and any intuitionistic probabilistic event structure E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub)
over L, let us define the function P
∐















i (v, e ), (6.12)
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i (w ) =
∑
v≤w
{Pi (v ) |M,v |= φ and M,v  ψ for allψ ∈ mb([[φ]])}. (6.13)
Recall that mb(a) denotes the multiset of the ≺-maximal elements of Φ ≺-below a (see Defini-
tion 4.15).
Lemma 6.19. For every M, Pi and E as in Definition 6.18 and for every w ∈ S ,
P
φ
i (w ) = ((Pi )




i (w ) =
∑
v≤w














+ (w ↓ ∧[[φ]]) − (Pi )+ w ↓ ∧
∨
[[ψ ]]∈mb([[φ]])
[[ψ ]]	 (see Lemma 6.11 and Equation (6.9))
= ((Pi )
+)[[φ]] (w ↓). (see Definition 4.15 and Equation (4.2))










+)′ : Mini 
∏
E






Pi (e ) · μai ( f (e )) · pre(e | a).
By Lemmas 6.13 and 6.15, it is enough to show that P
∐
i = (((Pi )
+)′)+. We show this by induction
on the well-founded order ≤
∐
.




+)′( f ) = (P
∐
i )





i (v, e ). (IHf )
The case where f = ⊥ is trivially true. Notice that the element (w, e )↓ corresponds to the map
д(w,e ) : E → S such that д(w,e ) (e ) = w ↓ and д(w,e ) (e ′) = ∅ for every e ′  e . Hence, we have:
((Pi )
+)′(д(w,e ) ) =
∑
φ ∈Φ




Pi (e ) · Pφi (w ) · pre(e | φ). (Lemma 6.19 and (4.4))
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Notice that
(((Pi )
+)′)+ ((w, e )) = ((Pi )
+)′(д(w,e ) ) − ((Pi )+)′( f ) (see Definition 6.12)
with f (e ) = w↓ \ {w } and f (e ′) = ∅ for e ′  e .
Notice that f < д. Hence, by the induction hypothesis on f , we have
((Pi )











i (v, e ).
Hence, we get
(((Pi )
+)′)+ ((w, e )) = ((Pi )














i (v, e )
= P
∐
i ((w, e )). (see Definition 6.18)

6.4 Dualizing the Updated APE Structures
In the present section, we introduce the generalization of the construction of the update model
presented in Section 2.2 and show that it dualizes the construction of the updated APE structure
presented in Section 4.5.
Definition 6.21. For any epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉, any epistemic
intuitionistic Kripke model M = 〈F , [[·]]〉 and any intuitionistic probabilistic event structure E =
(E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub) over L, let
pre : E → L
e →
∨ {
ϕ ∈ Φ | pre(e | ϕ)  0
}
.
Definition 6.22 (Updated Intuitionistic Structure). For any epistemic intuitionistic Kripke
model M = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag, [[·]]〉 and any intuitionistic probabilistic event structure E =
(E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub) over L (see Definition 6.10), let the updated intuitionistic struc-
ture of M and E be the tuple:
ME := 〈S E , ≤E , (REi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]E〉,
where
• S E = {(w, e ) ∈ ∐ |E | S | M,w |= pre (e )},
• ≤E = ≤
∐
∩ (S E × S E ),
• REi = R
∐
i ∩ (S E × S E ) for each i ∈ Ag,
• [[·]]E : AtProp→ PS is defined by
[[p]]E :=
{
(w, e ) ∈ S E | M,w |= sub(e ) (p)
}
for every p ∈ AtProp.
For any epistemic intuitionistic Kripke model M = 〈F , [[·]]〉, let
F E := 〈S E , ≤E , (REi )i ∈Ag〉.
Lemma 6.23. If M = 〈F , [[·]]〉 is an epistemic intuitionistic Kripke model, then so is ME . Moreover,
(F E )+ = (F+)E
E
.
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Proof. It follows from Reference [34, Definition 4.7, Fact 4.8] and Lemma 6.17. 
Definition 6.24. For any epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉, any epis-
temic intuitionistic Kripke model M = 〈F , [[·]]〉, any i-probability distribution Pi on F (see Defini-
tion 6.10), and any intuitionistic probabilistic event structure E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub)
over L, the updated i-probability distribution P Ei : S E → ]0, 1] is defined as follows:
P Ei (w, e ) :=
P
∐




i is as for Definition 6.18.






Proof. By Corollary 6.8 and Lemma 6.17, the i-minimal elements of (ME )+ are the equivalence
cells of Ri . Now, let д ∈ (ME )+, f the i-minimal element above д, and (w, e ) ∈ д. By Lemma 6.20,∑{P∐i (w ′, e ′) | (w ′, e ′)REi (w, e )} = (P
∐
i )
+ ( f ) and
∑
(w ′,e ′)∈д P
∐
i (w













+ ( f )
=
∑
(w ′,e ′)∈д P
∐
i (w











P Ei (w, e )
= (P Ei )
+ (д). 
6.5 Relational Semantics for IPDEL
Definition 6.26. An IPDEL-model is a structure N = 〈M, (Pi )i ∈Ag〉 such that M = 〈S, ≤,
(Ri )i ∈Ag, [[·]]〉 is an epistemic intuitionistc Kripke model, and Pi is a probability distribution
over S for every i ∈ Ag. For every IPDEL-model N and every event structure E, we let NE =
〈ME , (P Ei )i ∈Ag〉 (cf. Definitions 6.22 and 6.24).
It can be verified straightforwardly that for every IPDEL-model N and every event structure E,
the structure NE is an IPDEL-model.
Definition 6.27 (Semantics of IPDEL). For every IPDEL-model N = 〈M, (Pi )i ∈Ag〉 where M =
〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag, [[·]]〉, the IPDEL-formulas are interpreted on N as follows:
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N, s |= ⊥ iff never
N, s |= p iff s ∈ [[p]]
N, s |= ϕ ∧ψ iff N, s |= ϕ and N, s |= ψ
N, s |= ϕ ∨ψ iff N, s |= ϕ or N, s |= ψ
N, s |= ϕ → ψ iff N, s ′ |= ϕ implies N, s ′ |= ψ for every s ′ ≤ s
N, s |= ♦iϕ iff there exists s ′Ris such that N, s ′ |= ϕ
N, s |= iϕ iff N, s ′ |= ϕ for all s ′(≥ ◦ Ri )s
N, s |= 〈E, e〉ϕ iff N, s |= pre (e ) and NE , (s, e ) |= ϕ
N, s |= [E, e]ϕ iff N, s |= pre (e ) implies NE , (s, e ) |= ϕ
N, s |= 
n∑
k=1




+ ([[φ]] ∩ Ri [s]) ≥ β .
Recalling that in epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frames, and hence on IPDEL-models, the re-
lations Ri are both upwards and downwards closed, this implies that the seventh clause in the
definition above can be simplified as follows:
N, s |= iϕ iff N, s ′ |= ϕ for all s ′Ris .
7 CASE STUDY: DECISION-MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
In the present section, we illustrate the relational semantic update process described in Section 6
by means of a case study that involves the assessment of the likelihood of a socially constructed
event (a bankruptcy), taking place at some point in the future.
The focal feature of the case study is that this assessment depends to a greater extent on the
actions, beliefs, and expectations of the agents than on factual information.
In what follows, we first present the case study informally, and then we introduce a simpli-
fied formalization of the problem using probabilistic epistemic intuitionistic Kripke models and
probabilistic intuitionistic epistemic event structures.
7.1 Informal Presentation
Around 1950, there was a small businessmanw in Amsterdam whose main business was to sell the
products of foreign textile manufacturers to Dutch clothing firms. Like most small businessmen in
Amsterdam at the time, he banked with the Amsterdamsche Bank (which later became the present
ABN AMRO).
One day,w received an invitation to lunch with one of the directors of that bank. This invitation
puzzled him a great deal, because he did not know this director personally, and a small businessman
like him usually only dealt with bank employees at much lower levels. However, he accepted the
invitation and showed up for the lunch at the top floor of the bank’s headquarters in the city center.
During the copious lunch, the bank director talked about all kinds of general subjects and asked
w ’s opinion about the economic climate in Amsterdam. Rather than being flattered, w found it
hard to imagine he was invited to provide opinions about matters the bank knew better than he.
When the dessert was served, the banker mentioned aside some other matter the name of a certain
Amsterdam firm f , which was an important client ofw . This firm, the bank director said, was doing
very well under the present solid leadership.
The small businessman realized that this must have been the point of the whole lunch. And if
this large bank went to so much effort to increase the confidence of one small businessman in this
firm, it must have been very important to the bank that w believed that f was doing well.
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The small businessman said he wanted to wash his hands, although coffee still needed to be
served, but instead of walking to the bathroom he ran down the stairs and onto the street to find a
telephone booth and call the office to stop all deliveries to f and also claim back any supplies that
had already been delivered.
Two weeks later, f went bankrupt and it turned out that the bank not only was its major creditor
but also had preferential right to sell off any stocks in the possession of f to pay back the debt to
the bank before other creditors would be satisfied.
7.2 Analysis of the Situation
Let Bf be the following proposition:
“Firm f will bankrupt within a month.”
Notice that, while being two-valued, intuitionistic logic allows for Bf to be either true, false, or
undecided in a model, and the availability of the third option seems to adequately reflect real-life
situations. Indeed, there is a strict judicial procedure that establishes the truth of Bf , and when
this procedure is not (yet) in place, it seems reasonable to not assign it a truth value.
Accordingly, the sum of the probability attributed to Bf by w and the probability attributed to
¬Bf by w does not need to be 1.
For simplicity, we regard everything that happened from the invitation to the banker’s utterance
about firm f as one single event. We also propose that the uncertainty ofw concerns how to inter-
pret this event, and very much simplifying this story, the two mutually inconsistent interpretations
of this event are
e1: “The banker is trying to manipulate my opinions.”
e2: “The banker only wants to exchange information.”
The uncertainty of w about how to interpret the event is encoded in the shape of the event struc-
ture, which consists of two states, corresponding to e1 and e2 above, respectively, to each of which
w assigns his (subjective) probability.
For the sake of illustrating how the substitution map works and to simplify the subsequent treat-
ment, we also include the following atomic proposition M in our language, the intended meaning
of which is:
“The banker is manipulative.”
7.3 Formalization: Initial Model and Event Structure
Let the set of atomic propositions be AtProp := {Bf , M} as discussed above.
Initial Model. In the formalization discussed below, we only consider the viewpoint of agent w ;
hence, in the model and the event structure, we specify only the subjective probabilities of agent
w . The initial model is
M := 〈S, ≤,∼w , Pw , [[·]]〉
with:
• S := {s0, s1, s2},
• ≤ := {(s, s ) | s ∈ S } ∪ {(s1, s0), (s2, s0)},
• ∼w := S × S ,
• Pw : S → ]0, 1] with
Pw (s0) := 0.1, Pw (s1) := 0.1, Pw (s2) := 0.8,
• [[·]] : AtProp→ PS is such that [[Bf ]] := {s1} and [[M]] := ⊥.
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Fig. 2. Initial model M.
Fig. 3. Event structure E.
This model represents a situation in which w has no additional information about the financial
health of firm f . Hence, we assume that the probability assigned by w to each state of the model
reflects the average risk of bankruptcy of firms in that industry during that period. For w to be
willing to do business with f , it is not just enough that f does not have a higher probability of
bankruptcy than the average firm, but also the probability of being in an uncertain state should be
low. The model M is drawn in Figure 2.
Event Structure. We consider the following pointed event structure:
(E, e1) := (E,∼w , Pw ,Φ, pre, sub),
where
• E := {e1, e2},
• ∼w := E × E,
• Pw (e1) = 0.95 and Pw (e2) = 0.05,
• Φ = {, Bf ,¬Bf },
• pre : E × Φ→ [0, 1] is given in Figure 4.
• the definition of the map sub : E × {M} → L is given in Figure 5,
where e1 and e2 correspond to the two interpretations of the event discussed in the previous section
(that is, the probability w assigns to e1 is 19.8 times the probability w assigns to e2). The event
structure E is partially represented in Figure 3.
By stipulating that Pw (e1) = 0.95 and Pw (e2) = 0.05, we indicate that w believes that it is far
more likely that the banker is trying to manipulate his opinion on f .
The map pre provides the objective probability pre(e | ϕ) of each event e ∈ E happening when
one assumes that the formula ϕ ∈ Φ holds. Each line of Figure 4 gives the probability distribution
pre(• | ϕ) : E × [0, 1] for eachϕ ∈ Φ. The values in Figure 4 are based on the following assumptions:
• If we consider the row whereϕ = , which corresponds to the state in which the bankruptcy
of f is undetermined, it is reasonable to assume that the probability of e1, namely the banker
trying to manipulate w ’s opinion on f , is significantly higher than that of e2.
• If we consider the row where ϕ = Bf , which corresponds to the state in which f is going to
be bankrupt within a month, it is reasonable to regard e1 as almost certain.
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Fig. 4. The map pre.
Fig. 5. The map sub.
Fig. 6. The partial order given by (Φ,→).
• If we consider the row where ϕ = ¬Bf , which corresponds to the state in which f is finan-
cially healthy, then it is reasonable to assign a very low probability to the event in which
the banker wants to manipulate w ’s opinion about f , since the banker has nothing to gain
from it.
Remark 13. The poset Φ ordered by logical implication is a tree and is drawn in Figure 6.
7.4 Updated Model
In this section, we show how the initial model described in the section above is updated with the
event structure. The updated model
M(E,e1 ) :=
〈
S ′, ≤′,∼′w , P ′w , [[·]]′
〉
is defined as follows:
• S ′ := S × E,
• (s, e ) ≤′ (s ′, e ′) iff s ≤ s ′ and e = e ′ for all (s, e ), (s ′, e ′) ∈ S ′,
• (s, e ) ∼′w (s ′, e ′) iff s ∼w s ′ and e ∼w e ′ for all (s, e ), (s ′, e ′) ∈ S ′,
• the map P ′w is shown in Figure 7, where the actual values are rounded off,
• the map [[·]]′ : AtProp→ PS ′ is defined as follows:
[[Bf ]]
′ := [[Bf ]] × E;
[[M]]′ := ([[sub(e1, M)]] × {e1}) ∪ ([[sub(e2, M)]] × {e2})
= {(s0, e1), (s1, e1), (s2, e1)}.
The updated model M(E,e1 ) is drawn in Figure 7.
As expected, the fact that w assigns a much greater probability to e1 than e2 implies that the
probabilistic weight of the model above is concentrated among the three leftmost states. Of these
three states, the weight is shared almost equally between the two in which Bf is either true or
undecided, which reverses the subjective probability assigned in the initial model. This reversal
captures w ’s decision to abruptly stop all deliveries to f .
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Fig. 7. Updated model ME.
7.5 Syntactic Inference of a Formal Condition about the Case Study
In the present section, we use the Hilbert style presentation of IPDEL to derive the logical equiva-
lence (7.1). The right-hand side is a dynamic formula expressing that after the event,w reverts his
opinion and assigns greater probability to the bankruptcy of f (and to the banker’s manipulative
intentions). The left-hand side of this equivalence describes the threshold of reasonable optimism
that enablesw to revert his opinion after the event. Namely, for the event (E, e1) to revertw ′ opin-
ion, the ratio between the probability thatw assigns to ¬Bf and to Bf needs to be smaller than the
value (19.8) of the ratio between the probability w assigns to e1 and to e2.
Proposition 7.1. The formula
(19.8μw (Bf ) > μw (¬Bf )) ↔ [E, e1](μw (M ∧ Bf ) > μw (¬M ∧ ¬Bf )), (7.1)
where αμi (φ) > βμi (ψ ) is shorthand for (βμi (ψ ) ≥ αμi (φ)) → ⊥, is derivable in IPDEL.
Proof. To show the equivalence (7.1), we will use the IPDEL axioms to equivalently rewrite its
right-hand side into its left-hand side.
[E, e1](μw (M ∧ Bf ) > μw (¬M ∧ ¬Bf ))
iff [E, e1]
(
(μw (¬M ∧ ¬Bf ) ≥ μw (M ∧ Bf )) → ⊥
)
(notation for >)
iff 〈E, e1〉(μw (¬M ∧ ¬Bf ) ≥ μw (M ∧ Bf )) → 〈E, e1〉⊥ (I11 in Table 2)
iff 〈E, e1〉(μw (¬M ∧ ¬Bf ) ≥ μw (M ∧ Bf )) → ⊥. (I6 in Table 2)
In what follows, we focus on equivalently rewriting the antecedent of the implication above.
〈E, e1〉(μw (¬M ∧ ¬Bf ) ≥ μw (M ∧ Bf ))












′) · pre(e ′ | ϕ) · μϕw (〈E, e ′〉(M ∧ Bf )) ≥ 0 (I18 in Table 2)
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′) · pre(e ′ | ϕ) · μϕw (〈E, e ′〉(M ∧ Bf ))
iff Pw (e2) · pre(e2 | ¬Bf ) · μw (¬Bf ) ≥ Pw (e1) · pre(e1 | Bf ) · μw (Bf ) (by Lemma 7.2)
iff 0.05 · 0.95 · μw (¬Bf ) ≥ 0.95 · 0.99 · μw (Bf ) (Definition of (E, e1))
iff 0.05 · μw (¬Bf ) ≥ 0.99 · μw (Bf ) (by Lemma C.4)
iff μw (¬Bf ) ≥ 19.8μw (Bf ). (by Lemma C.4)
Hence,
〈E, e1〉(μw (¬M ∧ ¬Bf ) ≥ μw (M ∧ Bf )) → ⊥
iff (μw (¬Bf ) ≥ 19.8μw (Bf )) → ⊥
iff 19.8μw (Bf ) > μw (¬Bf ),
as required. 
Lemma 7.2. The following propositions are provable in IPDEL.
(1) 〈E, e1〉(M ∧ Bf ) ↔ Bf and 〈E, e1〉(¬M ∧ ¬Bf ) ↔ ⊥;
(2) 〈E, e2〉(¬M ∧ ¬Bf ) ↔ ¬Bf and 〈E, e2〉(M ∧ Bf ) ↔ ⊥;
(3) μw (Bf ) = 0 and μ

w (¬Bf ) = 0;
(4) μ
Bf
w (¬Bf ) = 0 and μ
¬Bf
w (Bf ) = 0;
(5) μ
Bf
w (Bf ) = μw (Bf ) and μ
¬Bf
w (¬Bf ) = μw (¬Bf ).
Proof. Proof of item (1).
〈E, e1〉(M ∧ Bf )
iff 〈E, e1〉M ∧ 〈E, e1〉Bf (I8 in Table 2)
iff pre (e1) ∧ sub(e1, M) ∧ pre (e1) ∧ sub(e1, Bf ) (I2 in Table 2)
iff sub(e1, M) ∧ sub(e1, Bf ) (pre (e1) is  ∨ Bf ∨ ¬Bf )
iff  ∧ Bf (Definition of sub)
iff Bf
and
〈E, e1〉(¬M ∧ ¬Bf )
iff 〈E, e1〉¬M ∧ 〈E, e1〉¬Bf (I8 in Table 2)
iff (pre (e1) ∧ (¬〈E, e1〉M)) ∧ (pre (e1) ∧ (¬〈E, e1〉Bf )) (I12 and I6 in Table 2)
iff pre (e1) ∧ ¬(pre (e1) ∧ sub(e1, M)) ∧ pre (e1) ∧ ¬(pre (e1) ∧ sub(e1, Bf )) (I2 in Table 2)
iff ¬sub(e1, M) ∧ ¬sub(e1, Bf ) (pre (e1) is  ∨ Bf ∨ ¬Bf )
iff ¬ ∧ ¬Bf (Definition of sub)
iff ⊥. (¬ ↔ ⊥)
Proof of item (2). The proof is similar to that of item (1).
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Proof of item (3). Notice that μw (Bf ) is shorthand for μw ( ∧ Bf ) − (μw (Bf ∧ Bf ) +
μw (¬Bf ∧ Bf )) (cf. Definition 4.15). Therefore:
μw (Bf ) = 0
iff μw ( ∧ Bf ) − (μw (Bf ∧ Bf ) + μw (¬Bf ∧ Bf )) = 0
iff μw ( ∧ Bf ) − μw (Bf ∧ Bf ) = 0 (P1 in Table 2 and Lemma C.4)
iff μw (Bf ) − μw (Bf ) = 0.
The last equality follows by N0 in Table 2. The proof of the second inequality is similar.
Proof of item (4). Notice that μ
Bf
w (¬Bf ) is shorthand for μw (Bf ∧ ¬Bf ) and μ
¬Bf
w (Bf ) is
shorthand for μw (¬Bf ∧ Bf ). Hence, the equality follows from Axiom P1 in Table 2.
Proof of item (5). Notice that μ
Bf
w (Bf ) is shorthand for μw (Bf ∧ Bf ) and μ
¬Bf
w (¬Bf ) is short-
hand for μw (¬Bf ∧ ¬Bf ). Hence, the required equality is straightforwardly true. 
Since, as discussed in Section 6, IPDEL is sound and complete with respect to the class of
relational models, Proposition 7.1 implies that every IPDEL model M that supports the left-
hand side of the equivalence (7.1) will be updated by the event (E, e1) to a model that satisfies
μw (M ∧ Bf ) > μw (¬M ∧ ¬Bf ). Hence, in each such model, agentw will update his subjective proba-
bilities concerning Bf analogously to the model in the example above (see Section 7.4 and Figure 7).
8 CONCLUSION
Present Contributions. In this article, we have introduced the logic IPDEL, the intuitionistic coun-
terpart of classical PDEL, as an instance of a general methodology based on the mathematical
construction of updates on algebras, which makes it possible to define non-classical counterparts
of DEL-type logics on different propositional bases. This methodology makes it possible to also
obtain the update construction on relational and topological models via appropriate (extended)
dualities, and hence define relational semantics for the defined logics. In this way, we have shown
that IPDEL—which is sound by construction with respect to the class of algebraic probabilistic
epistemic models (cf. Definition 5.3)—is also complete with respect to APE-models, and hence also
with respect to their dual relational structures. Since these structures are finite by definition, this
result immediately implies that IPDEL has the finite model property. The logic IPDEL is intended
as a tool to analyze decision-making under uncertainty in situations in which truth is socially con-
structed, and hence decisions are taken in contexts in which the truth value of certain states of
affair might be undetermined. To show IPDEL at work, we partially formalize one such situation.
Generalizing APE-structures. APE-structures are based on epistemic Heyting algebras (cf. Defi-
nition 4.3), the definition of which requires the image of each diamond operator to have a Boolean
algebra structure. Thus, epistemic Heyting algebras are a proper subclass of monadic Heyting al-
gebras. This additional condition guarantees that the i-minimal elements induce a partition on
the dual structure of each epistemic Heyting algebra, and hence that axioms such as μ () = 1 or
(μ (φ) ≥ α ) ∨ (μ (φ) < α ) are valid. One natural question that presents itself is whether this condi-
tion can be dropped, and hence APE-structures can be based on general monadic Heyting algebras.
Addressing this question requires solving issues of technical and conceptual nature. On the tech-
nical side, the additional requirement plays a role in the completeness theorem, and specifically
makes sure that—in the finite lattice that we extract from the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra—a sub-
lattice can be defined out of the image of each diamond (cf. Lemma C.3). This issue would partially
be addressed by relaxing the condition that APE-structures be finite (see paragraph below). On the
conceptual side, we would need to restructure the definition of probabilistic measure. The axiom
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(μ (φ) ≥ α ) ∨ (μ (φ) < α ) is tightly linked to the metatheory of the real numbers and in particular
to the validity of trichotomy. Hence, in the context of a different metatheory in which trichotomy
does not hold such as the constructive metatheory of real numbers, it seems reasonable that this
axiom might be dropped. However, the condition μ () = 1 expresses the link between probability
and the underlying logic. For this reason, this axiom should arguably be kept.
Finite to Infinite Models. Another natural question is whether we can drop the condition that
APE-structures be finite. A first step would be to investigate the case of APE-structures based on
perfect Heyting algebras, i.e., those Heyting algebras that are isomorphic to algebras of up-sets or
down-sets of given posets. Does every probability measure on such a Heyting algebra correspond
to a discrete probability distribution on the corresponding dual poset? More generally, possibly
infinite APE-structures would dually correspond to relational Esakia spaces endowed with prob-
ability distributions. Are there purely algebraic conditions on probability measures guaranteeing
that the corresponding probability distribution be discrete?
Proof Theory for Probabilistic Logics. As mentioned in the introduction, the present article per-
tains to a line of research aimed at studying the phenomenon of dynamic (probabilistic epistemic)
updates in contexts at odds with classical truth. The language and semantics of the formal settings
previously studied (i.e., those of the nonclassical versions of PAL and EAK) have served as a basis
for a research program in structural proof theory aimed at developing a uniform methodology for
endowing dynamic logics with so-called analytic calculi (see References [15, 30]). This research
program has successfully addressed PAL and DEL [25–27, 29], and PDL [24], and has been further
generalized into the proof-theoretic framework of multi-type calculi [25]. This methodology has
been successfully deployed to introduce analytic calculi for logics particularly impervious to the
standard treatment [13, 28, 31, 32] and is now ready to be applied to the issue of endowing PDEL
and its non-classical versions with analytic calculi.
APPENDICES
A PROOFS OF SECTION 4
Proof of Lemma 4.8
Lemma 4.8. For any PES-model M, the i-minimal elements of its complex algebraM+ are exactly
the equivalence classes of ∼i .
Proof. Let M = 〈S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]〉 be a PES-model and M+ = (PS, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag,
(P+i )i ∈Ag) be its complex algebra. For any i ∈ Ag and any s ∈ S , let [s]i be the ∼i -equivalence cell
of s . Fix i ∈ Ag.
First, let us prove that any∼i -equivalence cell corresponds to an i-minimal element ofM+. Since
∼i is reflexive, [s]i  ∅. Since ∼i is symmetric and transitive, [s]i = ♦i {s} = ♦i♦i {s} = ♦i [s]i . This
shows that [s]i is a fixed-point of ♦i . It remains to show that [s]i is a minimal fixed-point ♦i . Let
X ⊆ S be an i-minimal element of M+. By definition, we have that X ⊆ [s]i , X  ∅ and ♦iX = X .
The assumption that ♦iX = X implies that X =
⋃
x ∈X ♦i {x } =
⋃
x ∈X [x]i . The assumption that
X ⊆ [s]i implies that all x ∈ X must be ∼i -equivalent to s , and hence to each other. Therefore,
X cannot be the union of more than one equivalence cell. Moreover, the assumption that X  ∅
implies that there exists at least one equivalence cell in
⋃
x ∈X [x]i . This concludes the proof that,
for any s ∈ S , its ∼i -equivalence cell [s]i corresponds to an i-minimal element of M+, as required.
Now, let us prove that any i-minimal element of M+ corresponds to the ∼i -equivalence cell of
an element s ∈ S . Let X be an i-minimal element of M+. The assumption that X = ♦iX implies
that X =
⋃
x ∈X [x]i . The assumption that X  ∅ implies that there exists at least one equivalence
cell [s]i in
⋃
x ∈X [x]i . Since [s]i is an i-minimal element of M
+ and [s]i ⊆ X , we have X = [s]i by
minimality of X . 
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Proof of Proposition 4.9
Proposition 4.9. For any PES-model M, its complex algebra M+ (see Definition 3.1) is an APE-
structure (see Definition 4.7).
Proof. Let M = 〈S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]〉 be a PES-model (see Definition 2.2) and let M+ =
(PS, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag, (P+i )i ∈Ag) be its complex algebra. M+ is an APE-structure if its support is
an epistemic Heyting algebra and if each P+i is an i-measure over 〈S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag〉. Clearly,
(PS, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag) is an epistemic Heyting algebra (see Definition 4.3), since ∼i is an equiva-
lence relation and PS is a Boolean algebra. To finish the proof, we need to show that each P+i is an
i-measure on support(M+). Hence, for every i ∈ Ag, we need to prove the following properties:
(a) dom(P+i ) = Mini (support(M
+))↓;
(b) P+i is order-preserving;
(c) for every i-minimal element X ∈ PS and all Y1,Y2 ∈ X↓, we have
P+i (Y1 ∪ Y2) = P+i (Y1) + P+i (Y2) − P+i (Y1 ∩ Y2);
(d) P+i (∅) = 0 if dom(P
+
i )  ∅;
(e) for every i-minimal element X ∈ PS , we have P+i (X ) = 1.
(f) for every i-minimal element X ∈ PS and all Y1,Y2 ∈ X↓ such that Y1 ⊂ Y2, it holds that
P+i (b) < P
+
i (c ).
Fix i ∈ Ag.
Proof of (a). By definition, dom(P+i ) = {X ∈ PS | ∃y ∀x (x ∈ X ⇒ x ∼i y)}. Notice that{
X ∈ PS | ∃y ∀x (x ∈ X ⇒ x ∼i y)
}
= {X | X ⊆ [s] and s ∈ S } .
By Lemma 4.8, we deduce that dom(P+i ) = Mini (support(M
+))↓.
Proof of (b). Since Pi (s ) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S , the maps P+i are monotone.
Proof of (c). By Lemma 4.8, ifX is an i-minimal element of M+, thenX = [s] for some s ∈ S .
If Y1,Y2 ∈ X↓, then Y1 ∪ Y2 ⊆ [s]. Hence,
P+i (Y1 ∪ Y2) =
∑
x ∈Y1∪Y2




Pi (x ) +
∑
x ∈Y2




= P+i (Y1) + P
+
i (Y2) − P+i (Y1 ∩ Y2). (Definition of P+i )
Proof of (d). By definition, P+i (∅) = 0.
Proof of (e). Let X ∈ PS be an i-minimal element. By Lemma 4.8, there exists an s ∈ S such
that [s] = X . Hence, using the definition of Pi (see Definition 3.1), we have:
P+i (X ) =
∑
x ∈[s]
Pi (x ) = 1.
Proof of (f). Let X ∈ PS be i-minimal element and Y1,Y2 ∈ X↓ such that Y1 ⊂ Y2. By defini-




Pi (x ) =
∑
x ∈Y1
Pi (x ) +
∑
x ∈Y2Y1
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Since Y1 ⊂ Y2, there exists s ∈ Y2  Y1. Since Pi : S → ]0, 1], we have Pi (s ) > 0 for all s ∈ Y2  Y1.
Hence,
∑
x ∈Y2Y1 Pi (x ) > 0 and P
+
i (Y1) < P
+
i (Y2). 
Proof of Proposition 4.14
Proposition 4.14. for every epistemic Heyting algebra A and every agent i ∈ Ag,
Mini (A
′) = { fe,a | e ∈ E and a ∈ Mini (A)},
where for any e ∈ E and a ∈ Mini (A), the map fe,a is defined as follows:
fe,a : E → A
e ′ →
{
a if e ′ ∼i e
⊥ otherwise.
Proof. Recall that f ∈ A′ is an i-minimal element (see Definition 4.2) if it satisfies the following
conditions: (1) f  ⊥, (2) ♦i f = f , and (3) if д ∈ A, д < f and ♦iд = д, then д = ⊥.
Let us first prove that any map fe,a as above is an i-minimal element of A′. By definition,
fe,a (e ) = a  ⊥A. Hence, fe,a  ⊥A′ . As to showing that ♦′i fe,a = fe,a , fix e ′ ∈ E, and let us show
that (♦′i fe,a ) (e ′) = fe,a (e ′). By definition,
♦′i fe,a (e ′) =
∨
{♦i fe,a (e ′′) | e ′′ ∼i e ′}.
We proceed by cases: (a) If e ′ ∼i e , then:
♦′i fe,a (e ′) =
∨
{♦i fe,a (e ′′) | e ′′ ∼i e ′} (by definition)
=
∨
{♦ia | e ′′ ∼i e ′} (fe,a (e ′′) = a, since e ∼i e ′ and ∼i symmetric and transitive)
= ♦ia (the join is nonempty since ∼i is reflexive)
= a (a is i-minimal, hence is a fixed point of ♦i )
= fe,a (e
′). (definition of fe,a and e ′ ∼i e)
(b) If e ′  e , then:
♦′i fe,a (e ′) =
∨
{♦i fe,a (e ′′) | e ′′ ∼i e ′} (by definition)
=
∨
{♦i⊥ | e ′′ ∼i e ′} (e i e ′)
= ♦i⊥
= ⊥ (♦i⊥ = ⊥)
= fe,a (e
′).
Finally, we need to show that fe,a is a minimal non-bottom fixed-point of ♦′i . Notice preliminarily
that if д : E → A is a fixed point for ♦′i , then
д(e ) = д(e ′) whenever e ∼i e ′. (A.1)
Indeed,
д(e ) = (♦′iд) (e ) =
∨
{♦iд(e ′′) | e ′′ ∼i e} =
∨
{♦iд(e ′′) | e ′′ ∼i e ′} = (♦′iд) (e ′) = д(e ′).
Given that ∼i is reflexive, this implies in particular that, for every e ′ ∈ E,
(♦′iд) (e ′) = ♦iд(e ′). (A.2)
Let д be as above, assume that ⊥  д ≤ fe,a , and let us show that д = fe,a . Clearly, the as-
sumption д ≤ fe,a implies that д(e ′) = ⊥ for every e ′ ∈ E such that e ′ i e . Let e ′ ∈ E such that
д(e ′)  ⊥. Together with the assumption that д ≤ fe,a , this implies that fe,a (e ′)  ⊥, hence e ′ ∼i e
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and ⊥  д(e ′) ≤ a. To prove that д(e ) = a, by the i-minimality of a, it suffices to show that д(e ′) is
a fixed point of ♦i . Indeed, by (A.2):
♦iд(e ′) = (♦′iд) (e ′) = д(e ′),
as required. Finally, the fact above and the preliminary observation (A.1) imply that д(e ′) = a for
every e ′ ∈ E such that e ′ ∼i e .
This finishes the proof that fe,a is i-minimal.
Conversely, let д : E → A be i-minimal in A′, and let us show that д = fe,a for some e ∈ E and
some i-minimal element a ∈ A. The assumption that д  ⊥ implies that д(e )  ⊥ for some e ∈ E.
Letд(e ) = a ∈ A. Then, the assumption thatд = ♦′iд and the observation (A.1) imply thatд(e ′) = a
for every e ′ ∈ E such that e ′ ∼i e . Then, the proof is finished if we show that a is i-minimal in A.
Indeed, then, by construction, we would have ⊥  fe,a ≤ д, hence the minimality of д would yield
fe,a = д.
By definition, we have that a = д(e ′)  ⊥. By observation (A.2),
♦ia = ♦iд(e ) = (♦′iд) (e ) = д(e ) = a,
which shows that a is a fixed point of ♦i . Finally, let ⊥  b ≤ a such that ♦ib = b. Then, with an
argument analogous to the one given above, the map fe,b : E → A would be proven to be a non-
bottom fixed-point of ♦′i . Moreover, fe,b ≤ д, and hence the i-minimality of д would yield fe,b = д,
hence a = b. 
Proof of Proposition 4.16
Proposition 4.16. For every APE-structure F = (A, (μi )i ∈Ag) and every event structure E over A,
μai is an i-premeasure over A. Furthermore, if a ≤ y, then μai (x ) = μai (x ∧ y).
Proof. For every a ∈ Φ and every i ∈ Ag, we want to prove that μai is an i-premeasure over
A; hence, we need to prove that μai is a partial function A→ R+ that satisfies items (1–4) of
Definition 4.6. Fix a ∈ Φ and i ∈ Ag.
Proof of item (1). We want to prove that dom(μ ) = Mini (A)↓. The map μi is an i-
premeasure, hence dom(μi ) = Mini (A)↓. Therefore, the map μai is defined on every x ∈ Mini (A)↓
and we can restrict its domain as follows: dom(μai ) := Mini (A)↓.
Proof that μai is well defined. We need to prove that μ
a
i (x ) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Mini (A)↓.
Recall that Φ is a finite ordered multiset of elements of A such that, for all distinct b, c ∈ Φ, either
b ∧ c = ⊥ or b < c or c < b (see Definition 4.11 and Remark 8). Hence, for every b, c ∈ mb(a), we
have b ∧ c = ⊥. Indeed, by item (2) of Definition 4.10 and what was mentioned above, if b ∧ c  ⊥,
then either b ≺ c or c ≺ b. Hence, they cannot both be maximal.




x ∧ b =
∑
b ∈S
μi (x ∧ b). (A.3)




x ∧ b = μi (⊥) = 0 =
∑
b ∈S
μi (x ∧ b). (IH0)
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x ∧ b ′ =
∑
b′ ∈S ′
μi (x ∧ b ′). (IHn)






= μi (x ∧ c ) ∨
∨
b′ ∈S ′
(x ∧ b ′) (S = S ′ ∪ {c})
= μi (x ∧ c ) + μi 
∨
b′ ∈S ′
x ∧ b ′ − μi (x ∧ c ) ∧
∨
b′ ∈S ′
(x ∧ b ′) (μi is an i-premeasure)
= μi (x ∧ c ) + μi 
∨
b′ ∈S ′
x ∧ b ′ − μi 
∨
b′ ∈S ′
x ∧ c ∧ x ∧ b ′ (∧ distributes over ∨)
= μi (x ∧ c ) + μi 
∨
b′ ∈S ′
x ∧ b ′ − μi (⊥) (c  b ′ implies c ∧ b ′ = ⊥)
= μi (x ∧ c ) +
∑
b′ ∈S ′




μi (x ∧ b). (S = S ′ ∪ {c})
By induction, for any x ∈ Mini (A)↓, we have μi (
∨
b ∈mb(a) x ∧ b) =
∑
b ∈mb(a) μi (x ∧ b).
Since mb(a) denotes the set of the ≺-maximal elements of (Φ ∩ ↓a)  {a}, we have that∨
b ∈mb(a) x ∧ b ≤ x ∧ a. By monotonicity of μi , we get that
∑
b ∈mb(a)
μi (x ∧ b) = μi 
∨
b ∈mb(a)
x ∧ b	 ≤ μi (x ∧ a).
Hence, μai (x ) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ Mini (A)↓, as required.
Proof of item (2). We want to show that μai is order-preserving. Using (A.3) and the fact
that ∧ distributes over ∨, we get that: for any x ∈ Mini (A)↓,
∑
b ∈mb(a)
μi (x ∧ b) = μi 
∨
b ∈mb(a)





Fix x ,y ∈ Mini (A)↓ such that x ≤ y. Notice that
∨
b ∈mb(a) b ≤ a and x ∧ a ∧ y = x . Furthermore,
x ∧ a ≤ y ∧ a and y ∧ (∨b ∈mb(a) b) ≤ y ∧ a. Hence, (x ∧ a) ∨ (y ∧ (∨b ∈mb(a) b)) ≤ y ∧ a. From
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this, we can deduce that:





	 ≤ y ∧ a





	 ≤ μi (y ∧ a) (μi is order-preserving)




x ∧ a ∧ y ∧
∨
b ∈mb(a)
b	 ≤ μi (y ∧ a) (μi is an i-premeasure)







b	 ≤ μi (y ∧ a) (x ∧ a ∧ y = x )
⇔ μi (x ∧ a) − μi x ∧
∨
b ∈mb(a)





⇔ μi (x ∧ a) −
∑
b ∈mb(a)
μi (x ∧ b) ≤ μi (y ∧ a) −
∑
b ∈mb(a)
μi (y ∧ b) (by (A.4))
⇔ μai (x ) ≤ μai (y).
Proof of item (3). We need to show that μai (x ∨ y) = μai (x ) + μai (y) − μai (x ∧ y) for all
x ,y ∈ Mini (A)↓. We have:
μai (x ∨ y) = μi ((x ∨ y) ∧ a) −
∑
b ∈mb(a)
μi ((x ∨ y) ∧ b)
= μi ((x ∧ a) ∨ (y ∧ a)) −
∑
b ∈mb(a)
μi ((x ∧ b) ∨ (y ∧ b)) (distributivity)
= (μi (x ∧ a) + μi (y ∧ a)−μi (x ∧ y ∧ a)) −
∑
b ∈mb(a)
(μi (x ∧ b) + μi (y ∧ b) − μi (x ∧ y ∧ b))
(μi is an i-measure)
= μai (x ) + μ
a
i (y) − μai (x ∧ y).
Proof of item (4). If Mini (A)↓  ∅, it follows from μi (⊥) = 0 (because μi is an i-premeasure)
that μai (⊥) = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4.21










Proof. The proof that the supports of the two APE-structures (Definition 4.7) can be identified
is essentially the same as that of Reference [34, Fact 23.3] and is omitted. Recall that the basic
identification between P (∐ |E | S ) and ∏ |E | P (S ) associates every subsetX ⊆ ∐ |E | S with the map
д : E → P (S )
e → Xe := {s ∈ S | (s, e ) ∈ X }.
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In what follows, we fix a subsetX ⊆ ∐ |E | S in the domain of P∐i and letд ∈ ∏ |E | P (S ) be defined
as its counterpart as discussed above. Recall that for any s ∈ S and e ∈ E, pre(e | s ) denotes the

























Pi (e ) · 
∑
s ∈Xe










Pi (s ) · pre(e | s )	
















Pi (e ) · 
∑
ϕ ∈Φ









[[ϕ]] (Xe ) · preM (e | [[ϕ]])












Pi (e ) · (P+i )[[ϕ]] (д(e )) · preM (e | [[ϕ]])
= (P+i )
′(д) (Definition 4.17 on M+)

Proof of Lemma 4.26
Lemma 4.26. For any epistemic Heyting algebra A and any a ∈ A, if [b] ∈ Mini (Aa ), then ♦i (b ∧
a) is the unique i-minimal element of A that belongs to [b].
Proof. Let us first prove that ♦i (b ∧ a) ∈ [b]. By assumption, [b] ∈ Mini (Aa ), hence [b] =
♦ai [b] = b ∧ a = ♦i (b ∧ a) ∧ a. This implies that ♦i (b ∧ a) ∈ [b].
10Refer to Definitions 2.5 and 3.1 for the definitions of the intermediate structure
∐
EM and of the complex algebra
associated to a model.
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Now, we need to show that ♦i (b ∧ a) is an i-minimal element of A. Hence, we need to prove
that ♦i (b ∧ a) satisfies items (1), (2), and (3) of Definition 4.2.
Proof of item (1). By assumption, [b] ∈ Mini (Aa ), hence [b]  ⊥ and b ∧ a  ⊥. Since ♦i
is reflexive (Definition 4.1, axiom (M1)), ⊥  b ∧ a ≤ ♦i (b ∧ a), which shows that ♦i (b ∧ a)  ⊥,
as required.
Proof of item (2). Since ♦i is transitive (Definition 4.1, axiom (M6)), we have that ♦i (b ∧
a) = ♦i♦i (b ∧ a), as required.
Proof of item (3). Let c ∈ Mini (A) and c ≤ ♦i (b ∧ a). We need to prove that c = ♦i (b ∧ a).
To do so, we follow the following steps:
(i) we prove that [b] = [c],
(ii) we show that c ∧ a  ⊥,
(iii) we prove that ♦i (b ∧ a).
Step (i). From the assumptions that c ≤ ♦i (b ∧ a) and that [b] = ♦ai [b], we get that c ∧ a ≤
♦i (b ∧ a) ∧ a = b ∧ a, which proves that [c] ≤ [b].
Step (ii). Since c ≤ ♦i (b ∧ a), we have that c ≤ ♦ia; that is, c = c ∧ ♦ia. This gives the fol-
lowing chain of equalities:
c = c ∧ ♦ia = ♦ic ∧ ♦ia = ♦i (♦ic ∧ a).
The last equality is true in all monadic Heyting algebras (see, e.g., Reference [11, Definition 1]).
Now, since ♦ic = c , we get that c = ♦i (c ∧ a), which implies ♦i (c ∧ a)  ⊥ and c ∧ a  ⊥.
Step (iii). By Lemma 4.25, [c] ∈ Mini (Aa ). By the i-minimality of [b], we get [b] = [c]; that
is, b ∧ a = c ∧ a. Hence, ♦i (b ∧ a) = ♦i (c ∧ a) ≤ ♦i (c ) = c , which, together with the assumption
that c ≤ ♦i (b ∧ a), proves that ♦i (b ∧ a) = c , as required. This finishes the proof that ♦i (b ∧ a) is
an i-minimal element of A.
To show the uniqueness, let c1, c2 ∈ [b] and assume that both c1 and c2 are i-minimal elements
of A. Then, c1 ∧ a = c2 ∧ a, and hence ♦i (c1 ∧ a) = ♦i (c2 ∧ a). Reasoning as above, one can show
that⊥  ♦i (c j ∧ a) ≤ c j and ♦i (c j ∧ a) is a fixed point of ♦i for 1 ≤ j ≤ 2. Hence, the i-minimality
of c j implies that ♦i (c j ∧ a) = c j . Thus, the following chain of identities holds:
c1 = ♦i (c1 ∧ a) = ♦i (c2 ∧ a) = c2. 
Proof of Proposition 4.30
Proposition 4.30. For any APE-structure F and any event structure E over the support of F , the
tuple F E = (AE, (μEi )i ∈Ag) is an APE-structure.
Proof. Let E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre) be an event structure and F := (A, (μi )i ∈Ag) be an
APE-structure. To prove that F E is an APE-structure (see Definition 4.7), we need to prove that
AE is an epistemic Heyting algebra (see Definition 4.3) and that each map μEi is an i-measure on
AE. By Proposition 4.24, AE is an epistemic Heyting algebra. Hence, it remains to prove that, for
each i ∈ Ag, the map μEi is an i-measure (see Definition 4.6), i.e., we need to prove that:
(1) dom(μEi ) = Mini (A
E)↓;
(2) μEi is order-preserving;
(3) for every a ∈ Mini (AE) and all b, c ∈ a↓, it holds that μEi (b ∨ c ) = μEi (b) + μEi (c ) −
μEi (b ∧ c );
(4) μEi (⊥) = 0 if dom(μEi )  ∅;
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(5) μEi (a) = 1 for every a ∈ Mini (AE);
(6) for every a ∈ Mini (AE) and all b, c ∈ a↓ such that b < c , it holds that μEi (b) < μEi (c ).
Proof of (1). This condition is satisfied by definition.
The remaining items are trivially satisfied if the domain of μEi is empty. For the remaining of
the proof, let us assume that the domain of μEi is non-empty.
Proof of item (2). The definition of μ ′i (see Definition 4.17), the Proposition 4.16, and the fact
that, if pre(e | a)  0, then a ≤ pre (e ) (see Definition of pre (4.5)), imply that μ ′i (д) = μ ′i (д ∧ pre ).
Assume that [д1] ≤ [д2] ≤ [fe,a]. This means that д1 ∧ pre ≤ д2 ∧ pre . Since μ ′i is an i-premeasure
(Proposition 4.18), it is monotone. Hence, μ ′i (д1) = μ
′
i (д1 ∧ pre ) ≤ μ ′i (д2 ∧ pre ) = μ ′i (д2). This im-
plies that
μ ′i (д1)
μ ′i ( fe,a )
≤
μ ′i (д2)
μ ′i ( fe,a )
;
that is, μEi ([д1]) ≤ μEi ([д2]).
Proof of item (3). Let [д1] and [д2] in F E such that [д1] ≤ [fe,a] and [д2] ≤ [fe,a]. We have:
μEi ([д1] ∨ [д2])
=
μ ′i ((д1 ∧ pre ) ∨ (д2 ∧ pre ))
μ ′i ( fe,a )
=
μ ′i (д1 ∧ pre ) + μ ′i (д2 ∧ pre ) − μ ′i ((д1 ∧ д2) ∧ pre )
μ ′i ( fe,a )
(Proposition 4.18. μ ′i is an i − premeasure)
=
μ ′i (д1 ∧ pre )
μ ′i ( fe,a )
+
μ ′i (д2 ∧ pre )
μ ′i ( fe,a )
−
μ ′i ((д1 ∧ д2) ∧ pre )
μ ′i ( fe,a )
=
μ ′i (д1)
μ ′i ( fe,a )
+
μ ′i (д2)
μ ′i ( fe,a )
−
μ ′i (д1 ∧ д2)
μ ′i ( fe,a )
= μEi ([д1]) + μ
E
i ([д2]) − μEi ([д1 ∧ д2]).
Proof of Items (4) and (5). Trivial.
Proof of item (6). Recall that, if [д]  ⊥, then μEi ([д]) > 0 (see Claim in Lemma 4.29). Let
⊥  [д] < [h]. The monotonicity of the μai guarantees that, for all e ∈ E and a ∈ Φ, we have
Pi (e ) · μai (д(e )) · pre(e |a) ≤ Pi (e ) · μai (h(e )) · pre(e |a).
Furthermore, since [д] < [h], there exists an e ∈ E such that the set
{ a ∈ Φ | pre(e |a) > 0 and д(e ) ∧ a < h(e ) ∧ a }
is non-empty. Since Φ is finite, the order ≺ is well founded and the aforementioned set contains at
least one minimal element. Let a0 be such a minimal element. From Definition 4.11, we have that,
pre(e |b) > 0 for all b ∈ Φ with b ≺ a0. By the minimality of a0, we have that д(e ) ∧ b = h(e ) ∧ b
for all such b ≺ a0. Hence, ∑
b ∈mb(a0 )
μi (д(e ) ∧ b) =
∑
b ∈mb(a0 )
μi (h(e ) ∧ b),
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where mb(a) denotes the multiset of the ≺-maximal elements of Φ ≺-below a (see Definition 4.15).
Since F is an APE-structure, μi is strictly monotone. Hence, д(e ) ∧ a0 < h(e ) ∧ a0 implies that
μa0i (д(e )) = μi (д(e ) ∧ a0) −
∑
b ∈mb(a0 )
μi (д(e ) ∧ b)
< μi (h(e ) ∧ a0) −
∑
b ∈mb(a0 )
μi (h(e ) ∧ b)
= μa0i (h(e )).
Hence, for some e ∈ E and a ∈ Φ, we have
Pi (e ) · μai (д(e )) · pre(e |a) < Pi (e ) · μai (h(e )) · pre(e |a).
The inequality above, the definition of μ ′i (see Definition 4.17), and the monotonicity of μ
′
i (see
Proposition 4.18) imply that μ ′i ([д]) < μ
′
i ([h]), which in turn implies that μ
E
i ([д]) < μ
E
i ([h]). 
Proof of Lemma 4.32
Lemma 4.32. For any PES-model M and any event structure E over L,
(P+i )
EE  (P Ei )
+.
Proof. Using Definitions 2.7 and 3.1, we get that: for any X ∈ Mini ((ME )+)↓,
(P Ei )
+ (X ) =
∑
(s,e )∈X
Pi (e ) · Pi (s ) · pre(e | s )∑
(s ′,e ′)∼i (s,e ) Pi (e
′) · Pi (s ′) · pre(e ′ | s ′)
.






ϕ ∈Φ Pi (e ) · (P+i )[[ϕ]] (д(e )) · pre(e | [[ϕ]])∑
e ∈E
∑
ϕ ∈Φ Pi (e ) · (P+i )[[ϕ]] ( f (e )) · pre(e | [[ϕ]])
.
Let X ∈ Mini ((ME )+)↓. Following the notation introduced in the proof of Proposition 4.21, let
[д] ∈ Mini ((M+)E)↓ be the map such that
д : E → P (S )
e → Xe := {s ∈ S | (s, e ) ∈ X }.
Notice that X is a subset of one of the i-equivalence classes of (ME )+, hence д = д ∧ pre and
[д] ≤ [f ] for some [f ] ∈ Mini ((M+)E)↓. Let
[X ]i := {(s, e ) | ∃(s ′, e ′) ∈ X , (s, e ) ∼i (s ′, e ′)}.
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Pi (e ) · Pi (s ) · pre(e | s )∑
(s ′,e ′)∼i (s,e ) Pi (e
′) · Pi (s ′) · pre(e ′ | s ′)
=
∑
(s,e )∈X Pi (e ) · Pi (s ) · pre(e | s )∑
(s ′,e ′)∈[X ]i Pi (e
′) · Pi (s ′) · pre(e ′ | s ′)
(X is a subset of the equivalence classes [X ]i )
=
∑
e ∈E Pi (e ) ·
∑
s ∈Xe Pi (s ) · pre(e | s )∑
e ′ ∈E Pi (e ′) ·
∑
s ′ ∈f (e ′) Pi (s ′) · pre(e ′ | s ′)
(([X ]i )e = f (e ))
=
∑
e ∈E Pi (e ) ·
∑
ϕ ∈Φ pre(e | ϕ) ·
∑
s ∈д (e )∩[[ϕ]] Pi (s )∑
e ′ ∈E Pi (e ′) ·
∑
ϕ ∈Φ pre(e ′ | ϕ) ·
∑
s ′ ∈f (e ′)∩[[ϕ]] Pi (s ′)
(In the classical case, Φ gives a partition of S E )
=
∑
e ∈E Pi (e ) ·
∑
ϕ ∈Φ pre(e | ϕ) · (P+i ) (д(e ) ∩ [[ϕ]])∑
e ′ ∈E Pi (e ′) ·
∑




e ∈E Pi (e ) ·
∑
ϕ ∈Φ pre(e | ϕ) · (P+i )[[ϕ]] (д(e ))∑
e ′ ∈E Pi (e ′) ·
∑
ϕ ∈Φ pre(e ′ | ϕ) · (P+i )[[ϕ]] ( f (e ))





ϕ ∈Φ Pi (e ) · (P+i )[[ϕ]] (д(e )) · pre(e | [[ϕ]])∑
e ∈E
∑
ϕ ∈Φ Pi (e ) · (P+i )[[ϕ]] ( f (e )) · pre(e | [[ϕ]])
= (P+i )
EE ([д]). 
B PROOF OF THE SOUNDNESS OF IPDEL
Proposition B.1 (Soundness). The axiomatization for IPDEL given in Table 2 is sound w.r.t. APE-
models.
By definition, the underlying structure of an APE-structure is an epistemic Heyting algebra.
Hence, it satisfies the axioms of intuitionistic propositional logic and the axioms M1–M7 and E for
static modalities.
Axioms for Inequalities
As discussed in Remark 5, it is the case that
∨
Mini (A) =  for every epistemic Heyting algebra A.
This implies that axioms N0 and N5 are satisfied in every APE-model. Axioms N1, N2, N3, N4, and
N6 are also satisfied, because if the valuation of their antecedent is above any i-minimal element
a, then so will be the valuation of their succedent.
Axioms for Probabilities
The fact that axioms P1–P3 are satisfied in every APE-model is shown similarly as axiom N0. Since
♦iA is a subalgebra of A for every epistemic Heyting algebra A, it is the case that [[φ]]M ∈ ♦iA
for every i-probability formula φ and every APE-model based on A. Hence, Lemma 4.4 implies the
satisfiability of P5.
Finally, let us show that P4 is satisfied in every APE-model based on A. For the right-to-left
direction, as discussed in Remark 5, every element of ♦iA can be written as a union of i-minimal
elements, and therefore [[i (φ ↔ ψ )]] =
∨{a ∈ Mini (A) | a ∧ [[φ]] = a ∧ [[ψ ]]}. This of course
implies that
∨{a ∈ Mini (A) | a ∧ [[φ]] = a ∧ [[ψ ]]} ≤ [[μi (φ) = μi (ψ )]]. As for the left-to-right
direction, we have that [[i (φ → ψ ) ∧ (μ (φ) = μ (ψ ))]] =
∨{a ∈ Mini (A) | a ∧ [[φ]] ≤ a ∧ [[ψ ]]
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and μi (a ∧ [[φ]]) = μi (a ∧ [[ψ ]])}. By the strict monotonicity of the i-measure μi , the following
holds, as required.
[[i (φ → ψ ) ∧ (μ (φ) = μ (ψ ))]] ≤
∨
{a ∈ Mini (A) | a ∧ [[φ]] = a ∧ [[ψ ]]} = [[i (φ ↔ ψ )]].
Reduction Axioms
In this section, we aim at proving the soundness of the reduction axioms as stated in Lemma B.1.
To do so, we need to define two maps F and f as follows:
Preliminary Results. Throughout this section, we letA denote the complex algebra of a modelM
and E denote an event structure. Recall the definition of the event structure EE (cf. Definition 5.4).
Then, we define a map F : L →∏EE A that associates an element in ∏EE A to each formula. We
want F (Definition B.3) to be the map such that
[[ψ ]]MEE = [F (ψ )].
[[ψ ]]MEE is the evaluation of the formula ψ in the updated algebra A
EE corresponding to the
updated model MEE . Hence, F (ψ ) is a representative of the equivalence class [[ψ ]]MEE in the
product algebra AΠ .
Since F (ψ ) ∈ AΠ , F (ψ ) is a tuple of elements of the algebra A. To aid the computation, we
define the map f : L × E → L (see Definition B.2) such that F (ψ ) (e ) = [[f (ψ , e )]]M . This means
that f (ψ , e ) is a formula such that its evaluation [[f (ψ , e )]]M in the algebra A is equal to the eth
coordinate of the tuple F (ψ ). We first prove that the maps F and f have the desired properties in
Lemma B.4. Then, we prove the key lemma B.5 that we will use to prove the reduction axioms (see
Section B).
Definition B.2. The map f : L × E → L is defined by recursion as follows: for every ψ ∈ L
and e ∈ E,
f (p, e ) = sub(e,p),
f (⊥, e ) = ⊥,
f (, e ) = ,
f (ψ1 ∧ψ2, e ) = f (ψ1, e ) ∧ f (ψ2, e ),
f (ψ1 ∨ψ2, e ) = f (ψ1, e ) ∨ f (ψ2, e ),
f (ψ1 → ψ2, e ) = f (ψ1, e ) → f (ψ2, e ),
f (♦iψ , e ) =
∨
e ′∼i e
♦i ( f (ψ , e ′) ∧ pre (e ′)),
f (iψ , e ) =
∧
e ′∼i e
i (pre (e ′) → f (ψ , e ′)),
f (〈E′, e ′〉ψ , e ) = f (pre (e ′) ∧ f (ψ , e ′), e ),
f (
[E′, e ′] ψ , e ) = f (pre (e ′) → f (ψ , e ′), e ),






i ( f (ψ , e





′)pre(e ′ | ϕ) ≥ 0.
Definition B.3. Let us define the map FEE : L → AΠ such that for every e ∈ E, the eth coordinate
of FEE (ψ ) is equal to [[f (ψ , e )]]M .
For the sake of readability, we will omit the subscript when it causes no confusion.
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Lemma B.4. ForM and E as above,
[[ψ ]]MEE = [F (ψ )],
where F (ψ ) (e ) = [[f (ψ , e )]]M .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity ofψ with (IHψ ) : [[ψ ]]MEE = [F (ψ )]. The
statement is trivially true in the base cases and if the main connectives are ∧, ∨, or→.
Ifψ = ♦iψ ′, then
[[♦iψ ′]]MEE = ♦
EE [[ψ ′]]MEE









′) ∧ preM ) (e ) =
∨
e ′∼i e








♦i ( f (ψ ′, e ′) ∧ pre (e ′))]]M
= [[f (♦iψ ′, e )]]M (Definition B.2)
= F (♦iψ ′) (e ).
Ifψ = iψ ′, then













i (preM → F (ψ
′)) (e ) =
∧
e ′∼i e








i (pre (e ′) → f (ψ ′, e ′))]]M
= [[f (iψ ′, e )]]M (Definition B.2)
= F (iψ ′) (e ).

















′) ∧ fe,a )
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−βμϕi (a) · Pi (e










































































i ( f (ψ
′, e ′))Pi (e





′)pre(e ′ | ϕ) ≥ 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦M
= [[f (αμi (ψ
′) ≥ β,d )]]M (Definition B.2)
= F (αμi (ψ
′) ≥ β ) (d ).
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Ifψ = 〈E′, e ′〉ψ ′ and N =MEE , then
[[〈E′, e ′〉ψ ′]]N = [[pre (e ′)]]N ∧ πe ′ ◦ i ′([[ψ ′]]NEE′ )
= [[pre (e ′)]]N ∧ πe ′ ◦ i ′([F (ψ ′)]) (IHψ ′)
= [[pre (e ′)]]N ∧ πe ′ (F (ψ ′) ∧ pre )
= [[pre (e ′)]]N ∧ F (ψ ′) (e ′) ∧ [[pre (e ′)]]N
= [[pre (e ′)]]N ∧ [[f (ψ ′, e ′)]]N ∧ [[pre (e ′)]]N
= [[pre (e ′)]]N ∧ [[f (ψ ′, e ′)]]N
= [[pre (e ′) ∧ f (ψ ′, e ′)]]N
= [F (pre (e ′) ∧ f (ψ ′, e ′))] (IHpr e (e ′)∧f (ψ ′,e ′)N )
and
F (pre (e ′) ∧ f (ψ ′, e ′)) (e ) = [[f (pre (e ′) ∧ f (ψ ′, e ′), e )]]M
= [[f (〈E′, e ′〉ψ ′, e )]]M (Definition B.2)
= F (〈E′, e ′〉ψ ′) (e ).
Finally, ifψ = [E′, e ′]ψ ′ and N =MEE , then
[[
[E′, e ′] ψ ′]]N = [[pre (e ′)]]N → πe ′ ◦ i ′([[ψ ′]]NEE′ )
= [[pre (e ′)]]N → πe ′ ◦ i ′([F (ψ ′)]) (IHψ ′)
= [[pre (e ′)]]N → πe ′ (F (ψ ′) ∧ pre )
= [[pre (e ′)]]N → F (ψ ′) (e ′) ∧ [[pre (e ′)]]N
= [[pre (e ′)]]N → [[f (ψ ′, e ′)]]N ∧ [[pre (e ′)]]N
= [[pre (e ′)]]N → [[f (ψ ′, e ′)]]N (a → (a ∧ b) = a → b)
= [[pre (e ′) → f (ψ ′, e ′)]]N
= [F (pre (e ′) → f (ψ ′, e ′))] (IHpr e (e ′)→f (ψ ′,e ′))
and
F (pre (e ′) → f (ψ ′, e ′)) (e ) = [[f (pre (e ′) → f (ψ ′, e ′), e )]]M
= [[f (
[E′, e ′] ψ ′, e )]]M (Definition B.2)
= F (
[E′, e ′] ψ ′) (e ).

Lemma B.5. For everyM, E, e , andψ ,
[[〈E, e〉ψ ]]M = preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ , e )]]M and [[[E, e]ψ ]]M = preM (e ) → [[f (ψ , e )]]M .
Proof. We have
[[〈E, e〉ψ ]]M = [[pre (e )]]M ∧ πe ◦ i ′([[ψ ]]MEE )
= preM (e ) ∧ πe ◦ i ′([F (ψ )]) (Lemma B.4)
= preM (e ) ∧ πe (F (ψ ) ∧ preM )
= preM (e ) ∧ F (ψ ) (e ) ∧ preM (e )
= preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ , e )]]M
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and
[[[E, e]ψ ]]M = [[pre (e )]]M → πe ◦ i ′([[ψ ]]MEE )
= preM (e ) → πe ◦ i ′([F (ψ )]) (Lemma B.4)
= preM (e ) → πe (F (ψ ) ∧ preM )
= preM (e ) → F (ψ ) (e ) ∧ preM (e )
= preM (e ) → [[f (ψ , e )]]M ∧ preM (e )
= preM (e ) → [[f (ψ , e )]]M . (a → (a ∧ b) = a → b)

Proof of the Soundness of the Reduction Axioms.
Axiom I1. [E, e]p = pre (e ) → sub(e,p).
[[[E, e]p]]M = preM (e ) → [[f (p, e )]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) → [[sub(e,p)]]M .
Axiom I2. 〈E, e〉p = pre (e ) ∧ sub(e,p).
[[〈E, e〉p]]M = preM (e ) ∧ [[f (p, e )]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) ∧ [[sub(e,p)]]M .
Axiom I3. [E, e] = .
[[[E, e]]]M = preM (e ) → [[f (, e )]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) → [[]]M
= [[]]M .
Axiom I4. 〈E, e〉 = pre (e ).
[[〈E, e〉]]M = preM (e ) ∧ [[f (, e )]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) ∧ [[]]M
= preM (e ).
Axiom I5. [E, e]⊥ = ¬pre (e ).
[[[E, e]⊥]]M = preM (e ) → [[f (⊥, e )]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) → [[⊥]]M
= [[¬pre (e )]]M .
Axiom I6. 〈E, e〉⊥ = ⊥.
[[〈E, e〉⊥]]M = preM (e ) ∧ [[f (⊥, e )]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) ∧ [[⊥]]M
= ⊥.
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Axiom I7. [E, e] (ψ1 ∧ψ2) = [E, e]ψ1 ∧ [E, e]ψ2.
[[[E, e] (ψ1 ∧ψ2)]]M = preM (e ) → [[f (ψ1 ∧ψ2, e )]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) → [[f (ψ1, e ) ∧ f (ψ2, e )]]M (Definition B.2)
= preM (e ) → [[f (ψ1, e )]]M ∧ [[f (ψ2, e )]]M
= (preM (e ) → [[f (ψ1, e )]]M ) ∧ (preM (e ) → [[f (ψ2, e )]]M )
(a → b ∧ c = (a → b) ∧ (a → c ))
= [[[E, e]ψ1]]M ∧ [[[E, e]ψ2]]M . (Lemma B.5)
Axiom I8. 〈E, e〉(ψ1 ∧ψ2) = 〈E, e〉ψ1 ∧ 〈E, e〉ψ2.
[[〈E, e〉(ψ1 ∧ψ2)]]M = preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ1 ∧ψ2, e )]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e ) ∧ f (ψ2, e )]]M (Definition B.2)
= preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e )]]M ∧ preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ2, e )]]M
= [[〈E, e〉ψ1]]M ∧ [[〈E, e〉ψ2]]M . (Lemma B.5)
Axiom I9. [E, e] (ψ1 ∨ψ2) = pre (e ) → 〈E, e〉ψ1 ∨ 〈E, e〉ψ2.
[[[E, e] (ψ1 ∨ψ2)]]M = preM (e ) → [[f (ψ1 ∨ψ2, e )]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) → [[f (ψ1, e ) ∨ f (ψ2, e )]]M (Definition B.2)
= preM (e ) → preM (e ) ∧ ([[f (ψ1, e )]]M ∨ [[f (ψ2, e )]]M )
(a → b = a → a ∧ b)
= preM (e ) → (preM ∧ [[f (ψ1, e )]]M ) ∨ (preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ2, e )]]M )
(distributivity)
= preM (e ) → [[〈E, e〉ψ1]]M ∨ [[〈E, e〉ψ2]]M . (Lemma B.5)
Axiom I10. 〈E, e〉(ψ1 ∨ψ2) = 〈E, e〉ψ1 ∨ 〈E, e〉ψ2.
[[〈E, e〉(ψ1 ∨ψ2)]]M = preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ1 ∨ψ2, e )]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e ) ∨ f (ψ2, e )]]M (Definition B.2)
= (preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e )]]M ) ∨ (preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ2, e )]]M ) (distributivity)
= [[〈E, e〉ψ1]]M ∨ [[〈E, e〉ψ2]]M . (Lemma B.5)
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Axiom I11. [E, e] (ψ1 → ψ2) = 〈E, e〉ψ1 → 〈E, e〉ψ2.
[[[E, e] (ψ1 → ψ2)]]M = preM (e ) → [[f (ψ1 → ψ2, e )]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) → [[f (ψ1, e ) → f (ψ2, e )]]M (Definition B.2)
= preM (e ) → ([[f (ψ1, e )]]M → [[f (ψ2, e )]]M )
= preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e )]]M → [[f (ψ2, e )]]M (a → (b → c ) = a ∧ b → c)
= preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e )]]M → preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e )]]M ∧ [[f (ψ2, e )]]M
(b → c = b → b ∧ c ))
= [[〈E, e〉ψ1]]M → [[〈E, e〉ψ1]]M ∧ [[〈E, e〉ψ2]]M (Lemma B.5)
= [[〈E, e〉ψ1]]M → [[〈E, e〉ψ2]]M (b → c = b → b ∧ c )).
Axiom I12. 〈E, e〉(ψ1 → ψ2) = pre (e ) ∧ (〈E, e〉ψ1 → 〈E, e〉ψ2).
[[〈E, e〉(ψ1 → ψ2)]]M = preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ1 → ψ2, e )]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e ) → f (ψ2, e )]]M (Definition B.2)
= preM (e ) ∧ ([[f (ψ1, e )]]M → [[f (ψ2, e )]]M )
= preM (e ) ∧ (preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e )]]M → [[f (ψ2, e )]]M )
(a ∧ (b → c ) = a ∧ (a ∧ b → c ))
= preM (e ) ∧ (preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e )]]M → [[f (ψ2, e )]]M
∧ preM (e ) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e )]]M ) (b → c = b → b ∧ c ))
= preM (e ) ∧ ([[〈E, e〉ψ1]]M → [[〈E, e〉ψ1]]M ∧ [[〈E, e〉ψ2]]M ) (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) ∧ ([[〈E, e〉ψ1]]M → [[〈E, e〉ψ2]]M ) (b → c = b → b ∧ c )).
Axiom I13 [E, e]♦iψ = pre (e ) →
∨
e ′∼i e ♦i (〈E, e ′〉ψ ).
[[[E, e]♦iψ ]]M = preM (e ) → [[f (♦iψ , e )]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) → [[
∨
e ′∼i e
♦i ( f (ψ , e ′) ∧ pre (e ′))]]M (Definition B.2)
= preM (e ) →
∨
e ′∼i e
♦i ([[f (ψ , e ′)]]M ∧ preM (e ′))
= preM (e ) →
∨
e ′∼i e
♦i ([[〈E, e ′〉ψ ]]M ) (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) → [[
∨
e ′∼i e
♦i (〈E, e ′〉ψ )]]M .
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Axiom I14. 〈E, e〉♦iψ = pre (e ) ∧
∨
e ′∼i e ♦i (〈E, e ′〉ψ ).
[[〈E, e〉♦iψ ]]M = preM (e ) ∧ [[f (♦iψ , e )]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) ∧ [[
∨
e ′∼i e
♦i ( f (ψ , e ′) ∧ pre (e ′))]]M (Definition B.2)
= preM (e ) ∧
∨
e ′∼i e
♦i ([[f (ψ , e ′)]]M ∧ preM (e ′))
= preM (e ) ∧
∨
e ′∼i e
♦i ([[〈E, e ′〉ψ ]]M ) (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) ∧ [[
∨
e ′∼i e
♦i (〈E, e ′〉ψ )]]M .
Axiom I15. [E, e]iψ = pre (e ) →
∧
e ′∼i e i ([E, e ′]ψ ).
[[[E, e]iψ ]]M = preM (e ) → [[f (iψ , e )]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) → [[
∧
e ′∼i e
i (pre (e ′) → f (ψ , e ′))]]M (Definition B.2)




′) → [[f (ψ , e ′)]]M )




[E, e ′] ψ ]]M ) (Lemma B.5)




[E, e ′] ψ )]]M .
Axiom I16. 〈E, e〉iψ = pre (e ) ∧
∧
e ′∼i e i ([E, e ′]ψ ).
[[〈E, e〉iψ ]]M = preM (e ) ∧ [[f (iψ , e )]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM (e ) ∧ [[
∧
e ′∼i e
i (pre (e ′) → f (ψ , e ′))]]M (Definition B.2)




′) → [[f (ψ , e ′)]]M )




[E, e ′] ψ ]]M ) (Lemma B.5)




[E, e ′] ψ )]]M .
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C PROOF OF THE COMPLETENESS OF IPDEL
In the present section, we prove the weak completeness of IPDEL w.r.t. APE-models. Recall that a
calculus is weakly complete w.r.t. a semantics if it provides a proof for every validity; namely, for
any formula ϕ, if |= ϕ, then  ϕ. Similarly to akin logical systems (cf. References [10, 34, 36, 41] [2,
7, 14]), the proof relies on a reduction procedure of IPDEL-formulas to formulas of the static frag-
ment of IPDEL (referred to in what follows as IPEL), which preserves provable equivalence. This
reduction procedure is effected using the interaction axioms and the rule of substitution of equiv-
alent formulas. We omit the details, since this procedure is standard (see for instance References
[9, 10, 43] for details). In the reminder of the present section, we prove the weak completeness of
IPEL w.r.t. APE-models, i.e., we show that every APE-validity in the language of IPEL is a theorem
of IPEL. By contraposition, this is equivalent to proving that for any IPEL-formula φ that is not an
IPEL-theorem there exists an APE-modelM that does not satisfy φ in the sense that [[φ]]M  .
The proof will proceed as follows: In Section C.1, we extract a finite sublattice of the
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of the logic that contains φ, and we prove that it is an Epistemic
Heyting Algebra satisfying certain properties akin to those described in Reference [22]. Then,
in Section C.2, following ideas from Reference [21] adapted to the algebraic setting, we define ap-
propriate i-measures over the finite Epistemic Heyting Algebra to turn it into an APE-model that
does not satisfy φ.
C.1 The Epistemic Heyting Algebra Aφ
In this subsection, we construct the finite epistemic Heyting algebra on which the counter-model
forφ is based. The construction consists of a number of steps, starting with the Lindenbaum-Tarski




A,A,⊥A,∨A,∧A,→A, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag
)
(C.1)
denote the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of IPEL. We will use ¬A (•) as shorthand for • →A ⊥A. For
any agent i , we define:
♦iA := {♦ia ∈ A | a ∈ A}.
For any formula σ ∈ LI P EL , we let σA ∈ A denote the equivalence class of σ modulo provable
equivalence in IPEL. Let
B := (B,B,⊥B,∨B,∧B,¬B )
be the Boolean extension of the Heyting algebra reduct of A (see Reference [37, Section 13, page
450]).11 To enhance readability, we identifyAwith its image through the embeddingA ↪→ B. Recall
that A is a sublattice of B. Henceforth, we will use ∨ and ∧ and  and ⊥ ambiguously to denote
the operations on both algebras. Since ♦iA is a Boolean algebra (see Lemma 4.4) and, in every
Boolean algebra, negation is unique, we have that ¬Aa = ¬Ba for every a ∈ ♦iA and for every
agent i ∈ Ag.
Let φ be an IPEL-formula that is not a theorem. Let
Sφ := {σA | σ is a subformula of φ},
let Agφ be the set of agents that appear in φ and let S
♦
φ ⊇ Sφ be
S♦φ := Sφ ∪ {(♦iσ )A, (¬♦iσ )A | σ ∈ Sφ and i ∈ Agφ }.
11The Boolean extension of A can be identified with the algebra of clopens of the Esakia space dual to A. Notice that this
is exactly the same construction semantically underlying the Gödel-Tarski translation (cf. Reference [18, Section 3] for an
expanded discussion).
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Notice that the sets Sφ and S
♦
φ are finite. Now, let Bφ ⊆ B be the Boolean subalgebra of B generated
by S♦φ . Since S
♦
φ is finite, so will be the domain of Bφ (which we denote with Bφ ). In addition, since
Bφ is a sub-lattice of the non-trivial Boolean algebra B, it contains at least two elements and has
at least one atom. Plus, it follows that Bφ is generated by its atoms. In view of what will follow,
let us endow Bφ with a measure μB as follows: Let n ≥ 1 be the number of atoms of Bφ . For every










with Aφ := A ∩ Bφ . Notice that, since both A and Bφ are distributive lattices, so is Aφ . For every
agent i ∈ Agφ , we define
A♦iφ := {a ∈ Aφ | there exists σ ∈ L such that ♦iσ ∈ a} = Aφ ∩ ♦iA.
Notice that, if a ∈ A♦iφ , then ¬Aa ∈ A♦iφ as well (since ¬Ba ∈ Bφ and ¬Ba = ¬Aa). Hence, for every
agent i ∈ Agφ , (A
♦i
φ ,,⊥,∧,∨,¬A) is a Boolean subalgebra of Aφ . We are now ready to endow




Aφ ,→, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag
)
,
where, for all a,b ∈ Aφ ,
a → b :=
∨
{c ∈ Aφ | c ≤ a →A b} =
∨
{c ∈ Aφ | c ∧ a ≤ b},
for all i ∈ Agφ and a ∈ Aφ ,
♦i a :=
∧
{b ∈ A♦iφ | a ≤ b} and i a :=
∨
{b ∈ A♦iφ | b ≤ a},
for all i  Agφ and a ∈ Aφ ,
♦i a :=
{
 if a  ⊥,




⊥ if a  ,
 if a = .
The operations above are well defined, since Aφ is a finite distributive lattice, and hence all the
joins and meets exist.
Lemma C.2. For every i ∈ Agφ , the algebra Aφ satisfies the following properties:
(1) ♦i Aφ = {♦i a | a ∈ Aφ } ⊆ A
♦i
φ ;
(2) ♦i Aφ = i Aφ ;
(3) for all a ∈ A♦iφ , it holds that ♦i a = a and i a = a;
(4) for all a,b ∈ Aφ , if a →A b ∈ Aφ , then a → b = a →A b;
(5) for all a ∈ Aφ , if ♦ia ∈ Aφ (resp. ia ∈ Aφ ), then ♦i a = ♦ia (resp. i a = ia);
(6) for all formulas ψ ,φ ∈ L, if (♦iψ )A ∈ S♦φ (resp. (iψ )A ∈ S♦φ or (ψ → χ )A ∈ S♦φ ), then
♦i ψA = ♦iψA (resp. i ψA = iψA orψA → χA = ψA →A χA);
(7) ♦i Aφ = {♦i a | a ∈ Aφ } = A
♦i
φ .
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Proof. The first five items follow immediately from the definition of ♦i and i . Item (6) is an
application of items (4) and (5). Item (7) follows from items (1) and (3). 
Lemma C.3. The algebra Aφ is an epistemic Heyting algebra.
Proof. As mentioned early on, Aφ is a distributive lattice. Moreover, by definition,→ is the
right residual of∧ in Aφ . This shows that Aφ is a Heyting algebra. To prove that Aφ is an epistemic
Heyting algebra, it remains to show that Aφ satisfies the following axioms (c.f. Definition 4.1 and
Defition 4.3):
a ≤ ♦ia (M1)
ia ≤ a (M2)
♦i (a ∨ b) ≤ ♦ia ∨ ♦ib (M3)
i (a → b) ≤ ia → ib (M4)
♦ia ≤ i♦ia (M5)
♦iia ≤ ia (M6)
i (a → b) ≤ ♦ia → ♦ib (M7)
♦i⊥ ≤ ⊥ (M8)
 ≤ i (M9)
♦ia ∨ ¬♦ia = . (E)
Let i ∈ Agφ . By definition, it immediately follows that ♦i and i verify axioms M1 and M2.
Axiom M3 holds because♦i a ∨ ♦i b ∈ ♦iAφ anda ∨ b ≤ ♦i a ∨ ♦i b (and similarly for axiom M4).
As for axioms M5 and M6, since ♦i a,i a ∈ ♦iAφ , by item (3) of Lemma C.2, we obtain that
♦i i a = i a and ♦i a = i ♦i a, which imply the axioms.
In the context of axioms M1 through M6, axiom M7 is equivalent to ♦i (♦ip → ♦iq) → (♦ip →
♦iq) (see Reference [11, Lemma 2]), so let us show that Aφ satisfies ♦i (♦ip → ♦iq) → (♦ip →




φ is a Boolean algebra (and hence
contains ¬A♦i a), we have that
♦i a →A ♦i b = ¬A♦i a ∨ ♦i b ∈ A♦iφ ,
which implies by item (4) of Lemma C.2 that
♦i a → ♦i b = ♦i a →A ♦i b . (C.3)
Now, by item (3) of Lemma C.2, we have that
♦i (♦i a →A ♦i b) = ♦i a →A ♦i b,
which by the Equation (C.3) is equivalent to
♦i (♦i a → ♦i b) = ♦i a → ♦i b;
that is, Aφ satisfies ♦i (♦ip → ♦iq) → (♦ip → ♦iq).
Axioms M8 and M9 follow from the fact that ,⊥ ∈ Aφ ∩ ♦iA and item (3) of Lemma C.2.
Finally, axiom E follows immediately from item (4) of Lemma C.2 and from the fact that A♦iφ is
a Boolean algebra. Hence, if a ∈ A♦iφ , then (a →A ⊥A) ∈ A♦iφ . 
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C.2 Measures on Aφ
In this section, for each agent i ∈ Agφ , we will define an i-measure on the algebra Aφ and a valu-
ation on Aφ , so as to define an APE-modelMφ such that [[σ ]]Mφ = σA for every subformula σ of
φ. Before defining the measures, we will state some auxiliary results.
Lemma C.4. The system IPEL proves all classical truths about linear inequalities.
Proof. See Reference [21] for an explanation of why axioms N0 to N6 are enough. Notice that,
even though the result is proven for classical logic, it still holds for IPEL. Indeed, the fragment of
the logic involving inequalities is classical because of the axiom N5: (τ ≥ β ) ∨ (¬τ ≥ β ). 




αmμi (ϕm ) ≥ β→ 
∑
m
αmμi (ϕm ∧ ♦iψ ) ≥ β (C.4)
and ♦iψ ∧ 
∑
m
αmμi (ϕm ) < β→ 
∑
m
αmμi (ϕm ∧ ♦iψ ) < β (C.5)
are provable in IPEL.
Proof. We only prove (C.4), the proof of (C.5) being almost verbatim. Early on, we observed
(see Lemma 5.8) that axiom P4 implies the validity of iφ ↔ (μi (φ) = 1). This and axiom M5 (i.e.,
♦iψ ↔ i♦iψ ) imply
IPEL ♦iψ ↔ (μi (♦iψ ) = 1). (C.6)
Since IPEL ♦iψ → (♦iψ ∨ ϕm ) for every ϕm ∈ L, by rule Subμ , we obtain
IPEL μi (♦iψ ) ≤ μi (♦iψ ∨ ϕm ). (C.7)
From (C.7) and Lemma C.4, we deduce that
IPEL μi (♦iψ ) = 1→ μi (ϕm ∨ ♦iψ ) = 1. (C.8)









μi (ϕm ∧ ♦iψ ) + μi (ϕm ∨ ♦iψ ) − μi (♦iψ )
)
≥ β . (C.9)



























αm (μi (ϕm ∧ ♦iψ ) + μi (ϕm ∨ ♦iψ ) − μi (♦iψ )) ≥ β .
Again, by using Lemma C.4, we obtain that
IPEL (μi (♦iψ ) = 1) ∧
∧
m
(μi (ϕm ∨ ♦iψ ) = 1) ∧ B→ D (C.11)
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αmμi (ϕm ∧ ♦iψ ) ≥ β .




αmμi (ϕm ) ≥ β→ 
∑
m
αmμi (ϕm ∧ ♦iψ ) ≥ β ,
as desired. 
Observe that for any agent i ∈ Agφ , since Aφ is finite and ♦i Aφ = A
♦i
φ is a Boolean algebra, it
is the case that the i-minimal elements are the atoms of this Boolean algebra and every element of
A♦iφ can be written as the union of some of these i-minimal elements. Let ni be the number of i-
minimal elements ofAφ . Let us call a
i
k
, for 1 ≤ k ≤ ni , the i-minimal elements ofAφ . Now, for each
i-probability formula σ with σA ∈ S♦φ , we have that σA ∈ A♦iφ . Hence, we have that (¬σ )A ∈ A♦iφ .









It should be stressed that, since ∨ and ∧ in Aφ are inherited by A, these equalities hold in A as
well.
Now, let us fix i ∈ Agφ . For every k ∈ ni , we define a system of equations Eai
k
, with variables xb








αm · x i
ψ Am ∧aik
≥ β, for all σ := (∑αm · μi (ψm ) ≥ β ) with σA ∈ S♦φ and fσ (k ) = 1∑
αm · x i
ψ Am ∧aik
< β, for all σ := (
∑
αm · μi (ψm ) ≥ β ) with σA ∈ S♦φ and fσ (k ) = 0
x i
b
≥ 0 and xb ≤ 1, for all b ∈ Aφ with b ≤ aik
x i
b




b∨c , for all b, c ∈ A

φ with b, c ≤ aik
x i
b
≤ x ic , for all b, c ∈ Aφ with b ≤ c ≤ aik







For a solution s of the above system, we denote with (x i
b
)s the solution according to s of x i
b
.
Notice that the system is designed in such a way that any particular solution (cf. Lemma C.8)
provides an i-measure onAφ that guarantees that the valuation of an i-probability formulaσ isσ
A.
Indeed, the first two types of inequalities in the system will guarantee that exactly the i-minimal
elements of Aφ below σ
A will constitute [[σ ]] (see Definition 5.6). The rest of the inequalities will
guarantee that the solution satisfies the basic properties of i-measures.
Observe that, for every b ≤ ai
k
, there exists a formula τb such that b = τ
A
b
and if b ≤ c , then
IPEL τb → τc . Let Eτai
k
be the system of equations where each x i
b
is replaced by μi (τb ). Since a
i
k
is i-minimal, we can assume w.l.o.g that τai
k
is of the form ♦iτ ′. Furthermore, let PSi ⊆ S♦φ be
the set of i-probability formulas that are subformulas of φ. For every σA ∈ PSi such that σ :=
(
∑
αm · μi (ψm ) ≥ β ), let σ [aik ] be the formula
∑
αm · μi (ψm ∧ τai
k
) ≥ β .
Lemma C.6. For every k ∈ ni , the system Eai
k
has a solution.
12The sums in the system of equations Eai
k
range over m.
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Proof. Notice that all but the first two types of inequalities in Eτ
ai
k
are provable in IPEL, as
they are immediate consequences of axioms P1, P2, P3, and the rule Subμ . Heading towards a
contradiction, let us first assume that Eai
k
does not have a solution at all. This is a truth about
linear inequalities of rational numbers, hence, by Lemma C.4, it is provable in IPDEL. As mentioned






































































































































In addition, Aφ inherits the order from A and by construction a
i
k
≤ σA when fσ (k ) = 1 and aik ≤
(¬σ )A when fσ (k ) = 0. Hence, we have that, for all σ ∈ PSi , if fσ (k ) = 1, then IPEL τai
k
→ σ and
if fσ (k ) = 0, then IPEL τai
k




















ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, Vol. 20, No. 4, Article 24. Publication date: August 2019.




























We have reached a contradiction, because ai
k
is an element of A different from ⊥, and hence each
formula corresponding to it is consistent. Therefore Eai
k
has a solution. 
The next two lemmas are key to show that measures on Aφ satisfy the form of strict mono-
tonicity of item (6) of Definition 4.6. This condition generalizes to the intuitionistic setting the
requirement that probability distributions in the classical canonical model constructions (cf. Ref-
erences [1, 42]) be strictly positive. As far as we know, this is the most detailed presentation of this
fact, and its projection to the classical setting accounts for the details missing there.
Lemma C.7. For every k ∈ ni and every b < c ≤ aik , the system Eaik has a solution sb,c such that
(x i
b
)sb,c < (x ic )
sb,c .
Proof. Heading towards a contradiction, let b < c ≤ ai
k
such that, for every solution s of Eai
k
,
we have (x i
b
)s = (x ic )
s . This is a fact of inequalities of real numbers and, therefore, by Lemma C.4,
it is provable in IPEL. Since all but the first two types of inequalities in Eai
k


















→ μi (τb ) = μi (τc ).
Since IPEL τb → τc , necessitation implies IPEL i (τb → τc ). Using axiom P4((




μi (ϕ) = μi (ψ )
))







































13see proof of Lemma C.6.
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From (C.16) and (C.18), we deduce that
IPEL τai
k
→ i (τc → τb ).
By axiom M2 (ip → p), we have
IPEL τai
k
→ (τc → τb ),
which is equivalent to
IPEL (τai
k
∧ τc ) → τb .
Since IPEL τc → τai
k
, the equation above implies that
IPEL τc → τb .
This last equation is a contradiction, since in A, the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of IPEL, we have
that c  b. Therefore, for every such pair b < c ≤ ai
k





)sb,c < (x ic )
sb,c . 
Lemma C.8. For every k ∈ ni , the system Eai
k
has a solution s , such that (x i
b
)s < (x ic )
s for all b, c ≤
ai
k
with b < c .
Proof. By Lemma C.7, for every pair b < c ≤ ai
k





)sb,c < (x ic )
sb,c . Notice that the solution space of Eai
k
is a convex subspace ofRl , for some natural
number l . Indeed, it is immediate that the solutions of each linear inequality define a convex space
and the intersection of convex spaces is a convex space (cf. Reference [35, Chapter 12]). Let n be






sb,c is also a solution
of Eai
k
(see, e.g., Reeference [35, Chapter 12, Theorem 1.2]). Let us call this solution s and show
that if d < e , then (x i
d
)s < (x ie )
s .
Let d < e . Notice that, for every sb,c , it is the case that (x
i
d
)sb,c ≤ (x ie )sb,c by the restraints of the
system Eai
k
. Moreover, we have (x i
d















sb,c = (x ie )
s .
Therefore, we have that, for every pair d < e ≤ ai
k
, we have (x i
d
)s < (x ie )
s , as required. 
For every agent i ∈ Agφ and every system Eai
k
, pick a solution s satisfying the conditions of
Lemma C.8 and define μi (b) = (x ib )
s , for everyb ∈ Min(Aφ )↓. For agents j  Agφ , let μ j (b) = μB (b)
(see (C.2)). Now, we define an APE-model
Mφ = 〈Aφ , (μi )i ∈Ag,v〉 (C.19)
such that, for every p ∈ AtProp ∩ S♦φ , it holds that v (p) = pA.
Lemma C.9. The modelMφ is an APE-model.
Proof. For any i ∈ Agφ , the restrictions imposed by the systems of inequalities and the con-
ditions of Lemma C.8 immediately yield that μi is an i-measure. For j  Agφ , the only j-minimal
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element is . Furthermore, μB satisfies the restrictions of j-measures by definition. Hence, each μi
is an i-measure, and by Lemma C.3 and Definition 4.7, we have thatMφ is an APE-model. 
Lemma C.10 (Truth Lemma). For everyψ ∈ L such thatψA ∈ S♦φ , it is the case that
[[ψ ]]Mφ = ψ
A.
Proof. By definition, S♦φ is closed under subformulas. The proof proceeds by induction on the
complexity of ψ . For the atomic variables, this follows immediately from the definition of v . For
formulas of the formψ ∧ τ andψ ∨ τ , this follows from the fact that Aφ inherits ∨ and ∧ from A.
For formulas of the form ψ → τ , ♦iψ and iψ , it follows from item (6) of Lemma C.2. Finally,
for probability formulas of the form σ :=
∑
αmμi (ψm ) ≥ β , notice that, by the choice of μi as
particular solutions of the systems Eai
k
, exactly the i-minimal elements ai
k
≤ σA are such that∑
αmμi ([[ψm]]Mφ ∧ aik ) ≤ β . Hence, [[σ ]]Mφ = σ
A by definition (cf. Definition 5.6). This concludes
the proof. 
Proposition C.11 (Completeness). The axiomatization for IPDEL given in Table 2 is weakly
complete w.r.t. APE-models.
Proof. As discussed in the beginning of this section, the problem is reduced to proving the
weak completeness of IPEL. Let φ be an IPEL formula that is not a theorem. This means that
φA  A, where A is the Lindembaum-Tarski algebra of IPEL (see (C.1)). By Lemma C.9, the model
Mφ based on the algebra Aφ defined in (C.19) is an APE-model. By Lemma C.10, [[φ]]Mφ = φA.
Since Aφ = A, this shows that [[φ]]Mφ  
Aφ , which means that Mφ does not satisfy φ, as
required. 
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